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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS OF MILITARY
CHAPLAINS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS:
CASE LAW OF MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 503 AND 513

TARIK ABDEL-MONEM, JD/MPH,* MARK DEKRAAI JD/PHD,**
DENISE BULLING, PHD/LMHP***
I. Introduction
Alarmingly high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
suicide among Service members returning from military action 1 has
increased focus within the United States military about effectively
providing mental health services. 2 Concerns include problems related to
an insufficient mental health workforce, military culture, and delivery of
services. 3 Within this context, how sensitive personal information is
handled while seeking mental healthcare is a major concern for
servicemembers. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S.
Research Specialist at the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center. J.D., 2002,
University of Iowa; M.P.H., 2002, University of Iowa. This paper is based in part on
research conducted for the Department of Veterans Affairs: Chaplaincy Gap Analysis for
the Research, Education, and Clinical Center (MIRECC), Contract Number GS-10F0209U. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors only and not the
Department of Veterans Affairs, their respective institutions or anyone else.
** Senior Research Director at the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center. Ph.D.,
1990, University of Nebraska-Lincoln; J.D., 1982, University of Nebraska.
*** Licensed professional counselor and certified threat manager serving as a senior
research director with the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center. Ph.D., 2006,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln; M.A., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1987.
1 See Robert H. Pietrzak et al., Risk and Protective Factors Associated with Suicidal
Ideation in Veterans of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, 123 J. OF
AFFECT. DIS. 102, 102-07 (2010) (discussing rates of suicide among Iraq and Afghanistan
war service members and risk factors); Josefin Sundin et al., PTSD after deployment to
Iraq: conflicting rates, conflicting claims, 40 PSYCH’L MED. 367, 367-82 (2010)
(discussing data and rates of PTSD prevalence among veterans following deployment to
the Middle East).
2
See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PREVENTING PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS IN SERVICE
MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES: AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAMS 9-10 (2014) (discussing
the need to address mental health issues for military service members and their families in
the wake of deployment); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RETURNING HOME FROM IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN: READJUSTMENT NEEDS OF VETERANS, SERVICE MEMBERS, AND THEIR
FAMILIES 13-14 (2013) (outlining the scope of the military and estimates of mental health
issues among its members).
3 See Audrey Burnam et al., Mental Health Care for Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans,
28 HEALTH AFF’S 771, 771-82 (providing an overview of mental health services and
challenges within the military in light of continued deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan).
*
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Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) recently partnered to examine
opportunities for chaplains to have a role in improving mental health
efforts, largely because of their well-respected place within military
culture, and the absolute confidentiality they enjoy with
communications.4 This initiative—the Integrated Mental Health
Strategy—recognizes the important potential chaplains have to
promote mental healthcare.5 However, it generates a need to address
important practical concerns. A primary issue is how chaplains and
mental health providers can work—separately or together—to handle
sensitive mental health information of servicemembers.6 This is a
major concern because many servicemembers fear that disclosure of
mental health issues can jeopardize their military careers if they are
perceived as being unfit.7 At the same time, the appropriate
handling of such information can be instrumental in helping
servicemembers obtain assistance if needed. This raises the question
of what the current legal landscape is for the treatment of
confidential information by either chaplains or mental health providers
within military courts.
Military rules regarding privileged
communications are currently the primary sources of guidance on these
issues. This article provides an overview of applicable military case law
on the treatment of privileged communications for both chaplains and
mental health professionals. After the introduction in Part I, Part II
provides an overview of military chaplaincy, their potential role in
addressing mental health needs among servicemembers, and a summary
of the mental health landscape. Part III focuses on a review of military
cases concerning Military Rule of Evidence 503: Communications to
clergy. It identifies the policy rationale behind the clergy privilege, and
outlines major military appellate cases which have examined privileged
communications under this rule for chaplains, many of which are
relevant to situations involving instances of self-harm or harm to others.
Part IV outlines case law concerning Military Rule of Evidence 513:
Privileged Communications and Psychotherapists.
This section
identifies the policy rationale of the psychotherapist privilege, and
discusses major military appellate cases which have arisen since the
privilege was created by presidential order in
See infra discussion at notes 71-74.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, INTEGRATED MENTAL
HEALTH Strategy (Sept. 2010).
6 For example, HIPAA privacy protections for personal health information contains
exceptions for servicemembers. The military may access personal health information in
order “to assure the proper execution of the military mission.” 45 CFR 164.512(k)(1)(i).
7
See DoD Regulation 6025.18-R(C7.11.1.3) (allowing disclosure of health information
to military command to determine fitness for duty)
4
5
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1999. Finally, part V discusses the implications of this case law within the
framework of the wider policy goals of each rule of evidence, and offers
suggested guidance for those working in this area.
II. Chaplaincy and Mental Health in the Military
Chaplains have been active in the nation’s military since General
George Washington requested them to serve in the continental army in
1775. 8 Congress first funded chaplaincy positions for the Army and Navy
in 1791. 9 Since then, chaplains have taken part in hundreds of military
missions and served in over 120 countries. 10 Chaplains occupy a unique
space in military service. As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaplains’
main duties are to “accommodate religious needs, to provide religious and
pastoral care, and to advise commanders on the complexities of religion
with regard to its personnel and mission.” 11 The military must provide for
the free exercise of religion under the U.S. Constitution, so chaplains play
a primary role in facilitating religious activities for troops and
commanders. 12 This includes advising commanders about religious
affairs, ethical and moral issues, troop morale during all operations, and
providing or facilitating religious worship and support. 13 Thus, the
historical and still most important function of military chaplains is to
facilitate the free expression of religion within the services. 14

See The Chief of Chaplains, Strategic Roadmap: Connecting Faith, Service, and
Mission, ARMY.MIL 10 (n.d.), http://www.chapnet.army.mil/usachcs/pdf/chaplain_
roadmap.pdf (discussing history of American chaplaincy in military service); DEP’T OF
ARMY, REG. 165-1, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT: ARMY CHAPLAIN CORPS ACTIVITIES 1 (2009)
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS SUPPORT].
9 See CHARLOTTE HUNTER, A DEAL WITH THE DEVIL? THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
IN THE U.S. MILITARY, 140-41 (2006) (discussing history of chaplains in U.S. armed
forces).
10 See The Chief of Chaplains, supra note 7, at 4 (summarizing service of chaplains in the
U.S. military).
11 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS, JOINT PUBLICATION
1-05, I-1 (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF].
12 See id. at I-1–2 (discussing the role of chaplains in military service).
13 See id. at II-1 (outlining religious advisement and support activities of chaplains). See
also Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned: Chaplains, Armed Conflict,
and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2002) (discussing historical role of chaplains in the
U.S. military).
14 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF supra note 11 at I-1 (“US military chaplains are a unique
manifestation of the nation's commitment to the values of freedom and conscience and free
exercise of religion proclaimed in her founding documents.").
8
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Some commentators have questioned the constitutionality of militarysupported chaplaincy, arguing that it amounts to an establishment of
religion. 15 However, the services have emphasized the fundamental
importance of chaplaincy in maintaining freedom of religious expression
within the military. 16 Although these broad legal questions have been
discussed elsewhere, it is worth recognizing that federal courts have ruled
in favor of the constitutionality of military and government-sponsored
chaplaincy. 17
Contemporary chaplains play many day-to-day roles in the military.
Obvious examples include providing sacramental rites and religious
services for service members, advising command on troop morale, and
coordinating educational, community, family, or recreational activities. 18
Yet beyond religious services and counseling, a major role of chaplains in
both operational and garrison settings is monitoring the emotional wellbeing of servicemembers, in either informal or formal settings. This is
what chaplains commonly refer to as providing a “ministry of presence”—
a mix of emotional and social support, frequent visitation, clinical pastoral
See William J. Dobosh, Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause Implications
of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1493, 1499-1530
(2006) (discussing various establishment clause tests and their applicability to chaplaincy
sponsored by the government); Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Military
Chaplains and the First Amendment, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 174-81 (2007) (discussing
and critiquing the reasoning behind the Katcoff v. Marsh decision); Andy G. Olree, James
Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 145, 185-86 (2008)
(noting James Madison’s support for chaplains in military service around the time of the
War of 1812); Richard D. Risen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-One: The Military
Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1137, 1138-42
(2006) (discussing the history and merits of the Katcoff v. Marsh case).
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”). See also Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains
for the United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 247-53 (2004) (discussing the
case of James Yee and the obligations of military chaplains); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT
PUB. 1-05, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS I-1(Nov. 2013) (noting the obligation
of military chaplains to ensure freedom of religion).
17 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (finding the use of government-sponsored
chaplains in state legislatures to be constitutional); Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463
(E.D.N.Y 1984) (finding the use of chaplains in the U.S. military to be constitutional).
18 See generally RELIGIOUS SUPPORT, supra note 8, para. 1-2–1-7 (outlining the roles of
chaplains in the Army); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, OPNAV INSTR. 1730.1E, 4-7 (Apr. 2012)
(outlining the duties and responsibilities of chaplains in the Navy); NANCY B. KENNEDY,
MIRACLES & MOMENTS OF GRACE 20-232 (2011) (presenting stories of chaplain
experiences and activities in the armed forces); Pauletta Otis, An Overview of the U.S.
Military Chaplaincy: A Ministry of Presence and Practice, 7 REV. OF FAITH & INT’L AFF’S
3, 3-10 (2009) (providing an overview of military chaplains).
15
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counseling, or religious ministry for those who request it. 19 Because many
chaplains in deployment settings are literally where the Soldiers, Marines,
Airmen/women or Sailors are, they play a critical role in triaging those
individuals in need of help by determining whet her the need is for
emotional “first aid,” or more intensive clinical care by professionals.20
Some servicemembers are more likely to seek out chaplains to discuss
emotional or mental health issues than they would with mental health
professionals. This is because within military culture there may be less
stigma 21 attached to talking with a chaplain than with a mental health
professional.
Chaplains are more accessible, and mental health
professionals are not obliged to the same standards of confidentiality as
See Bruce W. Crouterfield, The Value of the Naval Chaplain in the Fleet Marine Force
Environment (Doctor of Ministry Thesis) 18-26 (Mar. 2009) (discussing the roles and
responsibilities of naval chaplains during deployment); Mark A. Tinsley, The Ministry of
Service: A Critical Practico-theological Examination of the Ministry of Presence and its
Reformulation for Military Chaplains 11-70 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished Master of Theology
Thesis, Liberty University) (on file with Liberty University) (discussing the ministry of
presence, its dynamics and limitations).
20
See Denise Bulling et al., Confidentiality and Mental Health/Chaplaincy
Collaboration, 25 MIL. PSYCH. 557, 558 (2014) (discussing the roles of chaplains within
the military services).
21 Military culture is generally considered to be unconducive to discussions about
mental health. See affidavit of James Anthony Martin in U.S. v Kreutzer, 59 M.J. 773,
813 (2004):
The peculiar culture at Fort Bragg was a tremendous influence in this
case. The pervasive atmosphere at Fort Bragg was that soldiers with
mental health problems should not seek mental health services.
Soldiers with mental health problems need to “suck it up and drive on”
and failure due to mental health falls into the area of “no excuses.”
19

Id. See also Paul Y. Kim, Thomas W. Britt, Robert P. Klocko, Lyndon A. Riviere, & Amy
B. Adler, Stigma, Negative Attitudes About Treatment, and Utilization of Mental Health
Care Among Soldiers, 23 MIL. PSYCH. 65, 65-81 (2011) (discussing impact of attitudes
toward mental health care and impact among mental health care usage among Iraq and
Afghanistan servicemembers); Robert H. Pietrzak et al., Perceived Stigma and Barriers to
Mental Health Care Utilization Among OEF-OIF Veterans, 60 PSYCH. SERV. 1118, 111822 (2009) (discussing stigma and barriers to mental health care among Iraq and
Afghanistan war veterans); Tiffany Greene-Shortridge, Thomas Britt, & Carl Andrew, The
Stigma of Mental Health Problems in the Military, 172 MIL. MED. 157, 157-61 (2007)
(discussing the problem of stigma in the military generally towards individuals with mental
health issues). Generally speaking, servicemembers would prefer to visit a chaplain rather
than a mental health professional because of the knowledge that chaplains enjoy higher
confidentiality protections. See Barbara J. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Matching To The
Beat of A Different Drummer: Is Military Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step after Jaffee
v. Redmond?, 41 AIR FORCE L. REV. 66-67 (1997) (discussing the stigma surrounding
mental health care and the preference for chaplains among service members).
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are chaplains. 22 Chaplains are professionally and ethically obliged to
maintain strict confidentiality in all matters, principally to maintain
absolute trust and confidence. 23 Legally, individuals have an official
privilege to prevent their communications to clergy from being
disclosed. 24 This is codified in the Military Rule of Evidence 503,
Communications to clergy, which remains a near absolute privilege. 25 In
contrast, Military Rule of Evidence 513, psychotherapist-patient privilege,
permits exceptions to the privilege to prevent disclosure in cases of child
abuse or neglect, legal obligations, safety to the person or others, future
commission of crime or fraud, or anything else that would jeopardize
safety of military personnel, property or mission. 26
There is a profound contrast in the absolute privilege that chaplains
enjoy, versus that of the psychotherapist. This has resulted in a defacto
situation where servicemembers will prefer to speak about their actions
with chaplains rather than mental health professionals about behavior that
may be illegal, pose dangers to themselves or others, or jeopardize their
military careers or family lives. This defacto reality is acknowledged in
United States v. Thompson (C.A.A.F. 1999), 27 in which a military attorney
involved in a claim for effective assistance of council testified as to why
he always advises military clients to confer with chaplains rather than
mental health professionals:
22 For a discussion of attitudes towards military mental health professionals prior to the
establishment of a confidential privilege in communications, see James Corcoran & John
Breeskin, Absence of Privileged Communications and its Impact on Air Force Officers, 19
A.F.L.REV. 51 (1977). In this article, the authors discuss the results of a survey of U.S.
Air Force officers and their preferences regarding whom to seek out to disclose personal
mental health matters. Results indicated that chaplains were the most cited category of
professionals to seek out, and that officers would also strongly prefer civilian mental health
professionals rather than military ones. The main reason for these choices was the lack of
confidentiality and fear that matters disclosed to military mental health professionals could
damage the careers of officers if they were disclosed to command.
23 See ROBERT C. LYONS, A CHAPLAIN’S GUIDE TO PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION (Master
of Theology Thesis) 70-79 (2001) (discussing the expectation of strict confidentiality
among chaplains). See also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, RELIGIOUS SUPPORT: ARMY
CHAPLAIN CORPS ACTIVITIES, ARMY REGULATION 165-1, 49-50 (2009) (outlining the
definition and parameters of privileged communications under U.S. Army regulations).
But see Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond Arm Bands and Arms Banned: Chaplains, Armed
Conflict, and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 58-59 (2002) (noting that definitions of
privileged communications and confidentiality differ between the services).
24 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 503 (2016) [hereinafter MCM].
25 Id.
26
Id. at r. 513
27 51 M.J. 431 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
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I remember him being distraught and informed him I was not
a counselor. However, I advised him to talk with a priest or a
chaplain, because of the penitent-priest privilege. I informed
him there would be no confidentiality with mental health. It
has been my habit to inform my clients they could talk to
anybody, but I recommend they talk only to my paralegal, a
chaplain, or me about the case, because of confidentiality. I
never prohibited a client from speaking to or seeking help
from someone other than myself, my defense paralegal, or
chaplain; however, I always warned them of the possible
consequences. 28
Because of both the surge in mental health needs among the military,
and a defacto culture which places less stigma on conferring with
chaplains rather than psychotherapists, there has been renewed focus on
utilizing military chaplains as key front-line personnel in military mental
health. In 2010, the DoD and DVA developed the Integrated Mental
Health Strategy (IMHS). 29 The purpose of the IMHS was to develop a
coordinated and comprehensive strategy to address mental health among
active duty service members, reserve and guard members, veterans, and
family. 30 The initiative was a direct response to the mental health needs
of those serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. 31 In particular, Strategic Action #23 of the IMHS focused on
the role of chaplains in improving services for integrated mental health
and spiritual care in the DVA system, and how chaplains can facilitate
continuity of mental health care between the armed services, DVA system,
and community. 32

Id. at 434.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, INTEGRATED MENTAL
HEALTH Strategy (Sept. 2010).
30 See id. at 2 (“The Departments will advance an integrated and coordinated public health
model to improve the access, quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of mental health
services for all Active Duty Service members, National Guard and Reserve members,
Veterans, and their families.”).
31 See id. (“The population of [servicemembers] and Veterans with mental health needs
continues to grow. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the war in Afghanistan, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the war in Iraq, are the longest wars in U.S. history that
have been fought with an all-volunteer force.”).
32 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE & DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, INTEGRATED
MENTAL HEALTH Strategy 119-23 (Sept. 2010) (outlining Strategic Action #23–Chaplains
role).
28
29
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The practical implications of chaplains’ involvement in mental health
support are profound. By providing ministry, presence, and formal or
informal pastoral counseling, chaplains can identify individuals in need of
assistance. Operational settings present significant mental health stresses:
continued deployments, 33 marital separation, 34 combat trauma, injury, or
death. This puts servicemembers at long-term risk for drug or alcohol
abuse, post-traumatic stress disorder, 35 serious or terminal illnesses, and
long-term spiritual injuries. 36 Chaplains are well-placed to refer serious
cases of concern to mental health professionals. Commenters have
discussed collaborative practices and models in which chaplains can work
with mental health professionals in operational settings to triage or refer
personnel for adequate help. 37 These practices leverage the accessibility
and lack of stigma that chaplains enjoy, and link them with mental health
and health care professionals. 38
See Joshua E. Buckman et al., The Impact of Deployment Length on the Health and
Well-being of Military Personnel: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 68 OCCUP’L &
ENVIR’L MED. 69, 69-76 (2011) (discussing findings from a meta-analysis of studies on the
impacts of deployment length on health outcomes and noting that longer deployment
generally resulted in worse outcomes).
34 See Major Peter S. Jensen, at al., The Military Family in Review: Context, Risk, and
Prevention, 25 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCH’Y 225-34 (1986) (discussing reviews of
studies on military families, including the impacts of marital separation).
35 See J. Douglas Brenner et al., Chronic PTSD in Vietnam Combat Veterans: Course of
Illness and Substance Abuse, 153 AM. J. PSYCH’Y 369-75 (1996) (discussing onset and
development of PTSD and substance abuse among veterans of the Vietnam War over an
extended period); Matthew Jakupcak et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as a Risk Factor
for Suicidal Ideation in Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans, 22 J. TRAUM. STRESS 303-06
(2009) (discussing prevalence of PTSD and other mental illnesses and risk for suicidal
ideation among veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan wars); Miles E. McFall et al., Combatrelated Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Severity of Substance Abuse in Vietnam
Veterans, 53 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL & DRUGS 357-63 (1992) (discussing impacts of PTSD
on substance abuse outcomes among Vietnam veterans).
36 See Kent D. Drescher et al., An Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the
Construct of Moral Injury in War Veterans, 19 TRAUM’Y 243-50 (2013) (outlining the
construct and presence of spiritual or moral injuries among war veterans from the
perspectives of chaplains and health professionals); Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen
Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, & Shira Maguen, Moral Injury
and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy, 29
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 695-706 (2009) (discussing the concept of moral or spiritual
injury among veterans and potential interventions).
37 See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and mental health in the Department of
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY 3, 4-14
(2013) (discussing recent initiatives in which chaplains in the DoD and DVA have
identified strategies for collaboration with mental health professionals)
38 See Frank C. Budd, An Air Force Model of Psychologist-Chaplain Collaboration, 30
PROF’L PSYCH.: RES. & PRACTICE 552-56 (1999) (discussing and recommending the need
for greater collaboration between mental health professionals and chaplains); Michael D.
33
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The active duty contexts in which mental health professionals work
varies widely, and depends on the service branch, deployment status or
garrison environment. Depending on the situation, a range of formal
counseling or behavioral health services can be available. 39 Much
emphasis has been placed on meeting the needs of those deployed for
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example,
the United States Army has structured its Comprehensive Behavioral
Health System of Care (CBHSOC) to align with force deployment
cycles. 40 This initiative is intended to provide a seamless system of care
from screening to treatment during all phases of active duty, and employs
the use of embedded mental health professionals within units. 41 Within
the Army, division psychiatrists still oversee all clinical activities within
command positions, and as part of their duties are regularly expected to
coordinate with medical personnel, chaplains, social workers and other
command officers. 42 In addition to providing direct clinical services, these
psychiatrists and mental health specialists are also responsible for
command directed evaluations, general and specialized screenings and
clearance evaluations, medical evaluation and forensic examinations, and
suicide incident-related activities, both in garrison and during active
deployment. 43 The Marine Corps has evolved a similar model called
OSCAR (Operational Stress Control and Readiness), in which
psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric technicians are embedded
Howard & Ruth P. Cox, Collaborative Intervention: A Model for Coordinated Treatment
of Mental Health Issue within a Ground Combat Unit, 173 MIL. MED. 339-48 (2008)
(discussing models for collaborative practices between unit chaplains and mental health
officers).
39 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, &
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
MILITARY AND VETERANS MENTAL HEALTH 12-16 (2013) (listing a variety of services for
suicide prevention and mental health services within each of the four service branches).
40 See REBECCA PORTER, THE ARMY COMPREHENSIVE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM OF
CARE (CBHSOC) CAMPAIGN PLAN: STANDARDIZE TO OPTIMIZE (2011).
41 See Christopher Warner et al., Division Mental Health in the New Brigade Combat
Team Structure: Part I. Predeployment and Deployment, 172 MIL. MED. 907, 907-11
(2007) (describing structure of clinical services within Task Force Baghdad in predeployment and deployment); Christopher Warner et al., Division Mental Health in the
New Brigade Combat Team Structure: Part II. Redeployment and Post Deployment,
172 MILI. MED. 907, 912-17 (2007) (describing structure of clinical services within
Task Force Baghdad in redeployment and post deployment).
42 See Christopher Warner et al., The Evolving Roles of the Division Psychiatrist, 172
MILITARY MEDICINE 918, 918-924 (2007) (discussing overall restructuring of mental health
resources within Army and role of the division psychiatrist).
43 See id. at 921 (outlining roles of Army division mental health).
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with combat units through deployment. 44 The purpose of the embedding
is to intentionally expose the mental health provider to the Marine in
combat and vice versa, so repeated contact creates trust and facilitates
early monitoring, intervention and treatment. 45
Despite the presence of mental health resources, confidentiality
remains a principal barrier to seeking help from mental health
professionals. An anonymous survey of Army Soldiers post-deployment
from Iraq or Afghanistan revealed up to four times the rate of depression
or PTSD than those reported on standard questionnaires. 46 A study
involving incidence of child sexual abuse indicated that Navy Sailors were
far more likely to report experiences on anonymous surveys rather than
screenings requiring identification. 47 The principal concern with
disclosing mental health problems is that doing so will jeopardize one’s
security clearance or entire military career. 48 For this reason, mental health
professionals in the armed services are widely known as “wizards” –
because they can make one “disappear” from the unit, or service
altogether. 49 Indeed, under the Health Insurance Portability and
44

See William Nash, Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR): The United
States Marine Corps Initiative to Deliver Mental Health Services to Operating Forces 110 (2006) (describing the OSCAR model and its creation and objectives).
45 See id. at 6-8 (discussing the functions of the OSCAR team).
46 See Christopher Warner et al., Importance of Anonymity to Encourage Honest Reporting
in Mental Health Screening After Combat Deployment, 68 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 1065, 1065-1071 (2011) (discussing findings from the use of anonymous post
deployment surveys compared to standard screening instruments and finding much higher
rates of depression and PTSD in anonymous surveys).
47 See Cheryl Olson, Valerie Stander, & Lex Merrill, The Influence of Survey
Confidentiality and Construct Measurement in Estimating Rates of Childhood
Victimization Among Navy Recruits, 16 MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 53, 53-69 (2004)
(discussing results from anonymous and non-anonymous survey conditions for
questionnaire involving child sexual experiences).
48
See Camilla Schwoebel & Roger Schlimbach, Confidentiality: A Conundrum in
Veterans Behavioral Health Care, 32 DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 1 (2013)
(discussing the example of a Navy Sailor worried about a PTSD diagnosis that would be a
“career ender”).
49 See David A. Litts, Suicide and Veterans, What we Know, How We Can Help, HEALTH
PROGRESS: JOURNAL OF THE CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES 24, 27
(May – June 2013) (“In some sectors of military culture, mental health professionals are
called ‘wizards.’ Go to the ‘wizard’ and he’ll make you disappear — from your military
unit that is — and leave you stereotyped as someone with a weak character.”); William
Nash, Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR): The United States Marine
Corps Initiative to Deliver Mental Health Services to Operating Forces 1, 2 (2006) (“In
U.S. military services, a common derogatory term for psychiatrists and psychologists
among the troops is “wizard,” referring disparagingly to mental health professionals’ one
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Accountability Act (HIPAA), which governs the management of personal
health information, specific exceptions are made for military service
members. Otherwise protected health information under the HIPAA
privacy rule may be provided to military command to assure “proper
execution of the military mission.” 50
Department of Defense health information privacy regulations allow
for the disclosure of health information about service members if it is
deemed necessary by command to properly execute a military mission,51
to determine the member’s general fitness for duty, 52 and to determine a
member’s fitness to perform a particular mission or activity. 53 Although
the DoD regulations do distinguish between general medical records and
psychotherapy notes, such notes are exempted from authorization
requirements for disclosure in order “to avert a serious and imminent threat
to health or safety of a person or the public, which may include a serious
and imminent threat to military personnel or members of the public or a
serious or imminent threat to a specific military mission or national
security.” 54 For positions that require security clearances, evidence of
mental health “issues” may derail the clearance process, jeopardizing an
individual’s career opportunities within the service. For example, U.S.
Army regulations governing the process for obtaining security clearances
consistent trick of being able to make service members with problems disappear from the
ranks of their services.”).
50 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k) (1)(i) (“Armed Forces personnel. A covered entity may use
and disclose the protected health information of individuals who are Armed Forces
personnel for activities deemed necessary by appropriate military command authorities to
assure the proper execution of the military mission.”). See also Camilla Schwoebel &
Roger Schlimbach, Confidentiality: A Conundrum in Veterans Behavioral Health Care, 32
DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 1-2 (2013) (discussing both HIPAA and DoD
regulations that implicate release of health information in military settings).
51 See Department of Defense, Health Information Privacy Regulation, C7.11.1.1, at 69
(DoD 6025.18-R) (January 2003):
A covered entity (including a covered entity not part of or affiliated
with the Department of Defense) may use and disclose the protected
health information of individuals who are Armed Forces personnel for
activities deemed necessary by appropriate military command
authorities to assure the proper execution of the military mission. Id.
See id. C7.11.1.3.1, at 70. (“To determine the member's fitness for duty, including
but not limited to the member's compliance with standards and all other activities…”).
53
See id. C7.11.1.3.2, at 70. (“To determine the member's fitness to perform any
particular mission, assignment, order, or duty, including compliance with any actions
required as a precondition to performance of such mission, assignment, order, or
duty.").
54 Id. at C5.1.2.2.5.
52
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state that, “[i]f information developed by the command indicates the
existence, current or past, of any mental or nervous disorder or emotional
instability, a request for a PSI will not be submitted and interim clearance
will not be granted.” 55
An affirmative mandate for reporting incidents of child abuse in
federal jurisdictions exists through the Victims of Child Abuse Act of
1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. 13031. The statute requires that persons
engaged in covered professional capacities or activities on federally owned
or operated property must report suspected child abuse to applicable
authorities. 56 The statute specifically requires reporting by physicians,
health care practitioners, mental health professionals, social workers,
counselors, alcohol/drug treatment professionals, and a variety of other
professions. 57 Chaplains or clergy are not, however, identified in the
statute’s list of covered professionals, no military cases and only
one federal case—Zimmerman vs. U.S.—has explored the issue of
whether military chaplains are covered in the statute’s reporting
requirements, but reached no direct conclusion.58 The statute does
however, specifically
55 Army Regulation 380-67: Security: Personnel Security Program, at 5-8 (Ground for
denial).
56 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13031(a)-(h):

A person who, while engaged in a professional capacity or activity
described in subsection (b) of this section on Federal land or in a
federally operated (or contracted) facility, learns of facts that give
reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of child abuse,
shall as soon as possible make a report of the suspected abuse to the
agency designated under subsection (d) of this section.
Id.

57 See id. at (b) Covered professionals (listing professionals mandated to report suspected
child abuse).
58 See Zimmerman v. U.S., 171 F.Supp.2d 281 (2001). In, Zimmerman the plaintiff’s
daughter had been sexually assaulted by a naval officer at West Point military academy,
was caught, and subsequently sentenced to confinement and dismissal from the Navy. The
officer had previously engaged in behavior that suggested he was a sexual predator, and
that information had been provided to a chaplain and other staff of a ministry program at
the academy. The chaplain and other staff had not warned authorities about the behavior,
and plaintiff sued arguing that they breached their responsibility to report suspected child
abuse under 42 U.S.C. 13031, allowing the officer to later assault his daughter. See id. at
283-287. The government argued that the chaplain staff was not covered under the statute
as they were clergy. Without ruling on the substance of the issue, the court held that in
order for them to not be covered, they needed to be acting in their capacities as clergy. See
id. at 298. This suggests that clergy acting in their professionals as chaplains may not be
covered by the statute’s reporting requirements, but the court never specifically answered
that inquiry.
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require psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health professionals
to report suspected child abuse. 59 The 42 U.S.C. 13031 reporting
requirements have been recognized and integrated into Department of
Defense 60 and Veterans Affairs 61 regulations. Additionally, DoD
instructions such as Instruction 6400.01 and others recognize DoD policy
to promote early identification and reporting of suspected child abuse,
assessment and treatment of abusers, and establishment of reporting
mechanisms. 62
Arguably, embedding mental health providers within active duty units
might alleviate the stigma of mental health professionals and enhance trust
within military culture. However, the regulatory framework that allows
personal health information to be provided to command is still a significant
barrier to communication between Service members and mental health
professionals. It should be noted that the military has developed services
that offer a degree of confidentiality and/or anonymity for Service
members concerned with mental health issues, such as Military OneSource
(www.militaryonesource.mil)
and
Military
Pathways
(www.militarymentalhealth.org). However, communications are still
subject to stated exceptions that mandate reporting in some instances. 63
The development of mechanisms for chaplains (who enjoy complete
confidentiality) to work with mental health providers (whose
communications are subject to significant exceptions) would aid in
fulfilling the objectives of an integrated mental health strategy for military
personnel. 64

42 U.S.C.A. § 13031(b)(2).
See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 6400.03 (Apr. 2014)
(outlining instructions for Family Advocacy Command Assistance Team).
61 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VHA DIRECTIVE 2012-022
(Sept. 2012) (outlining instructions for reporting cases of abuse and neglect).
62 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 6400.01 (Feb. 2015)
(outlining instructions regarding identification, reporting, and prevention of domestic and
child abuse).
63 See Frequently Asked Questions on Confidential Face-to-Face Non-medical Counseling,
http://www.militaryonesource.mil/counseling?content_id=267023 (stating “exceptions to
confidentiality are legal and military requirements to report child abuse, spouse abuse,
elder abuse, threats of harm to self or others and any present or future illegal activity”).
64 See Barbara J. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Matching To The Beat of A Different Drummer:
Is Military Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step after Jaffee v. Redmond? 41 AIR FORCE
L. REV. 66-67 (1997) (discussing the case of an Airman who committed suicide and did
not seek help because of fear it would jeopardize his career, concern about confidentiality
with mental health problems, and preferences for services members to talk with chaplains
because of the privileged communications).
59
60

302

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 225

III. Military Rule of Evidence 503: Privileged Communications and
Chaplaincy
The legal application of chaplain confidentiality is the concept of
privileged communication. Black’s Law Dictionary defines privileged
communication as “[t]hose statements made by certain persons with a
protected relationship such as husband-wife, attorney-client, priestpenitent and the like which the law protects from forced disclosure on the
witness stand at the option of the witness, client, penitent, spouse.” 65
Privileged communication is a long-standing legal device recognized in
common law and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.66 It was
first cited in the United States in the case of People v. Phillips67, in which
the court ruled that a priest could not be compelled to testify in court
against an alleged thief before a grand jury. 68 In 1828, New York enacted
the first statute recognizing the privilege, stating that no minister could be
forced to testify to the contents of a confession made to him. 69 The
functional basis of the privilege is that the social benefit of maintaining
confidentiality between an individual and their religious minister
outweighs the evidentiary value of that information presented in court. 70
By the early 1960s, almost all the states had developed a statute
recognizing a clergy privilege. 71 Generally speaking, these statutes
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.) 832 (1991).
FED. R. EVID. 501 (Privilege in General).
67 People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) (unpublished decision).
68 See Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent
Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 BYU L. REV.
489, 489-490 (2002) (describing the case of People v. Phillips, in which a catholic priest
was protected from testifying in court against the defendant).
69 See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 106 (1983) (discussing New York state legislation N.Y. Rev.
Stat. § 72, pt. 3, ch. VII, art. 8 (1828)).
70 See id. at 109-110 (“First, it is often stated that protecting the privacy of the conversation
between minister and penitent is in the general interests of society.”); Lennard K.
Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doctrine, 13 REGENTS
U. L. REV. 145, 160-161 (2000) (discussing the balancing of interests between compelled
testimony and preservation of confidentiality between a minister and penitent). Whittaker
notes that there is a constitutional argument for maintaining the privilege as well: If the
contents of a confession were to be disclosed in a court of law, it would impede an
individual’s freedom of religious expression as he might be discouraged from confessing
sins or thoughts to a minister—an important part of a person’s religious activity. Id.
71 See Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 107-108 (1983) (“From 1955 to 1963 fourteen more states
enacted minister’s privilege statutes. Today forty-six states and the District of Columbia
have enacted such statutes.”)
65
66
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recognize the existence of a privilege in cases where an individual is
seeking spiritual counsel with a member of the clergy while acting in his
or her professional capacity. 72 Since the creation of the privilege statutes,
civil law courts have grappled with a number of issues, including the
definition of who is considered a qualifying member of the clergy, 73
whether clergy were acting in their “official capacity” at the time they
received communications, 74 and other issues. The privilege has been
recognized by the Supreme Court, which stated in Trammel v. United
States (1980) 75:
The privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and
client, and physician and patient limit protection to
private communications. These privileges are rooted in
the imperative need for confidence and trust. The priestpenitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose
to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence,
what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to
receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.76
This understanding of the intent of the clergy privilege was also
reflected in the important case of United States v. Moreno (A.C.M.R.),77
discussed infra,78 in which the Army Court of Military Review stated
that:
The privilege regarding communications with a
clergyman reflects an accommodation between the
public's right to evidence and the individual's need to be
able to speak with a spiritual counselor, in absolute
confidence, and disclose the wrongs done or evils
thought and receive spiritual absolution, consolation, or
guidance in return. 79

72 See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past) Time for a Dangerous
Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege? 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627,
1647 (2003) (discussing the majority trends in state clergy-penitent statues).
73 See Yellin, supra note 69, at 114-121 (discussing cases defining covered clergyman).
74 See id. at 121-126 (discussing cases examining the status and situation of
clergymen while receiving communications from penitents).
75 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
76 Id. at 51.
77 20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985).
78 See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying discussion on the Moreno case.
79 Moreno, 20 M.J. at 626 (A.C.M.R. 1985).

304

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 225

The compelling policy rationale for the clergy privilege in the military thus
seems to be the protection of deeply personal communications about
spiritual matters with chaplains. This aligns with the primary historic role
of chaplains in the military to facilitate the free expression of religion
within the ranks. 80 The clergy privilege is the legal mechanism which
protects the confidentiality of servicemembers’ spiritual and religious
communications as a manifestation of the free practice of religion.
In recent years, however, the clergy privilege has been modified in the
civilian world as a matter of social policy. The most common situations
in which clergy privileges do not apply are in cases of child abuse or other
serious crimes. 81 Criticism of the privilege has grown sharper with the
revelation of child sexual abuse cover-ups within some Roman Catholic
parishes. 82 Many states thus currently maintain mandatory reporting
statutes for child abuse which include members of the clergy. 83 In such
cases, the reporting exceptions abrogate the privilege. The variation
within state statutes, however, has prompted some to call for the adoption
of uniform statutes to rectify conflicts between protecting victims of abuse
with clergy confidentiality. 84

See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF supra note 11 at I-1 (“US military chaplains are a unique
manifestation of the nation’s commitment to the values of freedom of conscience and free
exercise of religion proclaimed in her founding documents.”).
81 See id. at 1687-1699 (arguing for an exception to clergy-penitent statutes in cases where
a parishioner notifies a member of the clergy about intent or activity of harm to another
person); J. Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-Penitent Privilege
in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 681 (1997-1998) (discussing
disparities of treatment that might manifest due to the exercise of the clergy-penitent
privilege).
82 See generally Mary G. Frawley-O’Dea, The History and Consequences of the SexualAbuse Crisis in the Catholic Church, 5 STUDIES IN GENDER AND SEXUALITY 11 (2004)
(discussing the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic church and its impact on survivors and
the church); Christina Mancini & Ryan T. Shields, Notes on a (Sex Crime) Scandal: The
Impact of Media Coverage of Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church on Public Opinion, 42
J. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 221 (2014) (discussing news media stories about the Catholic Church
sex abuse scandals and public opinion about the church’s response); Thomas G. Plante &
Courtney Daniels, The Sexual Abuse Crisis in the Roman Catholic Church: What
Psychologists and Counselors Should Know, 52 PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY 381 (2004)
(discussing the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic church and stereotypical “myths”
involved with the crisis).
83 See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Clergy as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse
and Neglect (discussing the status of state laws on mandatory reporting and clergy),
http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2010/03_04/clergymandated.pdf
84
See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant
Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C.L. REV. 1127 (2003)
80
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The creation of the Integrated Mental Health Strategy, and its
recommendations for integrating chaplaincy more closely with military
mental health, does present a new context in which to consider the clergy
privilege, and its policy rationale. However, the military rule itself has
remained relatively static since its creation, and maintains no exceptions.
The heart of the privileged communication rule within the armed services
is Military Rule of Evidence 503, Communications to clergy. 85 In its
entirety, the rule states:
Rule 503. Communications to clergy
(a) General rule of privilege
A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another from disclosing a confidential
communication by the person to a clergyman or to a
clergyman's assistant, if such communication is made
either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of
conscience.
(b) Definitions
As used in this rule:
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, chaplain, or
other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an
individual reasonably believed to be so by the person
consulting the clergyman.
(2) A “clergyman's assistant” is a person employed by or
assigned to assist a clergyman in his capacity as a spiritual
advisor.
(3) A communication is “confidential” if made to a
clergyman in the clergyman's capacity as a spiritual
adviser or to a clergyman's assistant in the assistant's
official capacity and is not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in
furtherance of the purpose of the communication or to
those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.

(discussing the problem of conflict of societal interests and proposing uniform state laws
that rectify reporting with exercise of religion).
85 MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 503.
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(c) Who may claim the privilege
The privilege may be claimed by the person, by the
guardian, or conservator, or by a personal representative
if the person is deceased. The clergyman or clergyman's
assistant who received the communication may claim the
privilege on behalf of the person. The authority of the
clergyman or clergyman's assistant to do so is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
The critical components of the rule are (1) identification of the speaker
as the holder of the privilege; (2) requirement that the communication be
made as an act of religion or matter of conscience; and (3) requirement
that the clergyman be acting in a capacity as a “spiritual advisor”. If those
conditions are met, the communication cannot be revealed in courtsmartial against a defendant. 86 The party asserting the privilege—the one
attempting to stop the introduction of information in a court (usually the
defendant)—has the burden of showing the communication is privileged
by a preponderance of the available evidence.87 The few cases that have
examined the clergy privilege typically involve defendants’ counsels
requesting suppression of evidence in appellate cases. Whether the
privilege applies is a mixed question of fact and law. 88
It should be noted that communications to clergy is one of several
forms of privileged communication that were specifically identified in
86

See MIL. R. EVID. 1101 (discussing applicability of the rules of evidence and stating that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Manual, these rules apply generally to all courtsmartial, including summary courts-martial….”). It should be noted that the version of this
rule in the Military Commission Rules of Evidence is significantly different, as it carves
out a wide exception for communications about future commissions or a crime, or
concealment of a past crime. See MIL. C’MMN. R. EVID. 503(D). The military commission
rules – applicable to aliens in military commissions – thus contemplate situations in which
clergy are made aware of information about potential terrorist strikes or plans. This would
be the case for example of a U.S. service clergyman counseling a foreign national prisoner
in Guantanamo Bay. For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Jonathan G. Odom, Beyond
Arm Bands and Arms Banned: Chaplains, Armed Conflict, and the Law, 49 NAVAL L. REV.
1, 62-63 (2002) (discussing interview with a U.S. military chaplain who counsels detainees
at Guantanamo Bay).
87 See U.S. v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323 (2003) (discussing the framework for application of
communication privileges).
88 See U.S. v. Coleman, 26 M.J. 407, 409 (1988) (“The question of whether a privilege
exists is a mixed question of law and fact.”); U.S. v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603, 605 (1998) (“The
question of whether a privilege applies to a conversation ‘is a mixed question of law and
fact.’”); U.S. v. Shelton, 64 M.J. 32, 37 (2006) (“Whether a communication is privileged is
a mixed question of fact and law.”).
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section V of the Military Rules of Evidence. Thus, unlike the Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE), which contain no individual privileges and defer
to the courts to recognize such, the MRE codify specific privileged
communications. 89 The specification of privileges within the MRE was a
significant departure from the FRE, which served as the general
foundation for the military rules. When the MRE were created, the
drafting committee sought to align the MRE with the FRE where possible,
in order to create symmetry between the military and federal laws.90 The
codification of individual privileges within the MRE, however, reflected a
desire to minimize uncertainty and promote uniformity in the military
environment and courts-martial. 91 The new privileges in the MRE were
derived from the Manual for Courts-Martial, and commentary on proposed
privileges from the FRE adapted to this military environment. 92 MRE 501
outlines general rules for privileges, stating that no other claims of
privilege exist beyond those listed therein, unless required or provided by
the Constitution, 93 an Act of Congress, 94 or common law principles of the
federal courts. 95 It should be noted that rule 501 specifically bars a
privilege on communications to medical officers or civilian physicians. 96
As noted in the official commentary of the Military Rules of Evidence,
this is because “such a privilege was considered to be totally incompatible
with the clear interest of the armed forces in ensuring the health and fitness
for duty of personnel.” 97
See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that the interpretation of common law by the federal courts
governs claims of privilege).
90 See Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicial
Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1990) (describing the intention of the MRE
drafting work group to base the MRE on the FRE to the extent possible, with necessary
modifications to the military context).
91 See Major David L. Hayden, Should There Be A Psychotherapist Privilege in Military
Courts-Martial? 123 MIL. L. REV. 31, 70 (1989) (noting the intention of the MRE drafters
to provide simple, clear rules to privileges in order to fit the military environment).
92 See Lederer, supra note 81, at 26-27 (discussing codification of the individual privileges
in the MRE).
93 See MIL. R. EVID. 501(a)(1) (stating that no privilege exists unless required by “[t]he
Constitution of the United States as applied to members of the armed forces”).
94 See MIL. R. EVID. 501(a)(2) (stating that no privilege exists unless required by “[a]n act
of Congress applicable to trials by courts-martial”).
95
See MIL. R. EVID. 501(a)(4) (stating that no privilege exists unless required by
“principles of common law generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts pursuant to rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
96
See MIL. R. EVID. 501(d): “Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules,
information not otherwise privileged does not become privileged on the basis that it was
acquired by a medical officer or civilian physician in a professional capacity.”
97 See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL UNITED STATES A22-39 (2012).
89
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A. The seminal cases: Moreno, Beattie, Isham, and Shelton
Only a handful of cases that significantly implicate Rule 503 have
come before the military courts. The seminal case is United States v.
Moreno (A.C.M.R. 1985), 98 in which the Army Court of Military Review
reviewed the major criteria for the privilege to apply. The holding in
Moreno would thus serve as a major precedent for subsequent cases
analyzing the basic requirements for application of Rule 503. Although
the courts have yet to deal with a case involving the flow of
communications among or between chaplains and psychotherapists in a
mental health treatment setting, there are also two important cases that are
relevant to referral of servicemembers to other help-providing entities
within the service environment: United States v. Beattie (A.F.C.M.R.
1987), 99 and United States v. Isham (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 100
Additionally, United States v. Shelton (C.A.A.F. 2006) 101 provides further
guidance on the Moreno requirements, and discussion on the intent of the
communicator as a component of the Rule 503 privilege.
In United States v. Moreno (A.C.M.R. 1985), 102 the defendant Moreno
intentionally shot and killed another soldier he was having an affair with
in the barracks. Immediately after the killing, and before he had been
caught, Moreno went to a chapel on base to speak to an Army chaplain.
According to the chaplain, Moreno was extremely emotional and upset
and said, “I’ve sinned. I’ve hurt somebody real bad,” and confessed to the
shooting. 103 The chaplain called the barracks, learned that the killing had
occurred, and then told Moreno he would have to contact the police.
Moreno apparently consented to that action. The chaplain subsequently
contacted the military police, who came and arrested Moreno. Moreno
opted to remain silent after being taken into custody as per his Article 31
rights of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which states that no person
may be interrogated without being notified of his right to remain silent to
not incriminate oneself. 104 The trial judge allowed the chaplain’s

98

20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985).
1987 CMR LEXIS 622 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 7, 1987).
100 48 M.J. 603 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
101 64 M.J. 32 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
102 20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985).
103 See id. at 624-625 (outlining the facts to the case and the encounter between
Moreno and the chaplain after the shooting.)
104 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 831. Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited. The
article states that:
99
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testimony about the event at court, considering Moreno’s actions as a
confession to a crime, and not a spiritual discussion. 105 He was
subsequently convicted of murder by the trial court.
On appeal, Moreno argued that the chaplain’s testimony should have
been privileged under Rule 503 and not introduced in court. The Army
Court of Military Review identified three criteria for the rule to apply:
(1) The communication must be made either as a formal
act of religion or as a matter of conscience; (2) it must be
made to a clergyman in his capacity as a spiritual advisor
or to his assistant in his official capacity; and (3) the
communication must be intended to be confidential. 106
The court then found that the first two conditions were met, because
Moreno was 1) clearly wanting to communicate about a spiritual issue
(“I’ve sinned”), and 2) the Army chaplain was clearly a clergyman on duty
acting in his official role as a spiritual advisor. 107 As to the third condition,
the court noted that the chaplain believed that the primary purpose of
(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to
incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may
tend to incriminate him.
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him
that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of
which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him
may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make
a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the
statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to
degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article,
or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful
inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by courtmartial.
Id.

See U.S. v. Moreno, 20 M.J. 623, 626 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (discussing the trial court’s
consideration of the facts of the case and disagreeing with them).
106 Id. at 626.
107 See id. (“Chaplain George testified that, among the reasons he thought appellant came
to him, was because appellant had a conscience and knew the chaplain to be a man of God.
That testimony, plus appellant's opening remark to George, “I have sinned,” satisfy the first
two criteria.”).
105
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Moreno’s visit was to confess to the crime through the chaplain. However,
the court observed that Moreno himself could have easily turned himself
in without even seeing a chaplain, and from Moreno’s standpoint, the
primary purpose of this communication was to seek spiritual counsel for
his actions. The court thus held that, “As we read Mil. R. Evid. 503,
appellant’s intent is controlling, not [the chaplain’s] impression of it.” 108
Because Moreno intended for the conversation to be confidential, it thus
met all the requirements of Rule 503, and thus the chaplain’s testimony
should not have been admitted to the trial court.109 The Moreno holding
suggests that a necessary requirement of the Rule 503 test—that the
communication is intended to be confidential—is interpreted in favor of
the speaker, and should not be presumed to be meant as a confession
to command beyond the chaplain. An additional by-product of the
Moreno decision was its structuring of the Rule 503 requirements into
a three-pronged test, which would be cited in subsequent cases
by courts examining the clergy-penitent privilege.110
United States v. Beattie 111 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987) involved a question of
whether advising a service member to report himself for a crime was a
violation of Rule 503. In Beattie, the defendant airman went to a U.S. Air
Force base chapel to seek advice from a chaplain. Beattie met the
chaplain, and told him he wanted to turn himself in and seek help for child
sexual abuse. The chaplain believed that Beattie was basically asking for
a referral, and the chaplain thus suggested he go to the family advocacy
office to talk to a commander, but did not direct or order him to go. The
defendant went there, where the commander told him to go to the military
police. Beattie went to the police, and confessed to sexually abusing his
children. His statements were introduced at the trial court, and he
subsequently pled guilty to sexual abuse. 112
On appeal, Beattie argued that the chaplain’s referral amounted to a
violation of Rule 503. The Air Force Court of Military Review disagreed,
Id.
Id. (“Instead, we believe appellant's intent that the communication be confidential is
adequately revealed by his initial purpose for speaking with George and by his later refusal
to make a statement to investigators after being apprehended. We conclude the military
judge committed error in allowing Chaplain George to testify over appellant's objection.”).
110 See infra notes 114-136 and accompanying discussion on U.S. v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603
(1998) and U.S. v. Shelton, 64 M.J. 32 (2006), two recent Rule 503 cases which made use
of the three part Moreno test.
111
1987 CMR LEXIS 622 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 7, 1987).
112 See id. at 1-3 (outlining background to the case).
108
109
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and held that “[t]he privilege provided for under Rule 503 is against the
disclosure of a confidential communication, not giving advice when it is
requested.” 113 Therefore, there was no violation of Rule 503, and Beattie’s
conviction was affirmed. Beattie thus stands for the important holding that
a chaplain—upon being told of a troubling, illegal action—can refer the
speaker to another entity, and even inform them that their actions are
illegal, and such a referral would not be considered a privileged
communication. In this sense, the holding in Beattie supports what is a
critically important role for military chaplains—to refer troubled
servicemembers to other entities or available resources, but without
coercing the servicemember, or violating confidentiality.
United States v. Isham 114 revisited some of the same concerns
involving referral, and spoke to the extent confidential communications to
clergy can be shared with others and still be privileged under Rule 503. In
Isham, the defendant was a Marine experiencing anxiety and depression,
and went to seek help from the unit chaplain. During a private meeting,
Isham told the chaplain he had thoughts of shooting other people and then
killing himself. 115 The chaplain stopped Isham, and told him he would
have to break confidentiality and tell others of his thoughts. The
chaplain’s testimony was later provided in the court-martial in which
Isham was convicted of communicating a threat. 116
On appeal to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals,
Isham argued that the military trial judge had erred by allowing the
chaplain to testify against him. The court agreed with Isham. First, the
court held that the controlling rule in the case was the three-prong test
established in Moreno: whether the communication was an act of religion
or conscience, whether the chaplain was acting in official capacity as a
spiritual advisor, and whether the communication was intended to be
confidential. 117 The court found that the first two conditions were met
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 4.
48 M.J. 603 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
See id. at 604-607 (discussing the conversation between Isham and the chaplain).
See id. (same).
See id. at 605 citing Moreno discussed supra:
In Moreno, 20 M.J. at 626, our Army brethren listed three criteria for
the privilege on communications to clergy to apply: '(1) the
communication must be made either as a formal act of religion or as a
matter of conscience; (2) it must be made to a clergyman in his
capacity as a spiritual advisor...; and (3) the communication
must be intended to be confidential.’
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because Isham had sought out the chaplain, and met with him “in the
chaplain's office, while he was wearing the cross on his collar, and
discussed matters of conscience with obvious religious overtones.” 118 The
third prong, however, was at issue. The chaplain had explained to Isham
that he would inform others about the situation only to the specific and
limited extent that it could prevent Isham from carrying out his thoughts
of shooting others, and “[t]he appellant agreed to this further disclosure
for the limited purpose of getting help and preventing him from carrying
out his threats.” 119 In other words, Isham had agreed that information
would be disclosed only to the extent for him to get necessary help, but
believed that he would continue to serve as a Marine and not be courtmartialed. In Isham’s words: “I wanted to keep it confidential. That way,
nothing would affect me in the battalion. I could get help for my problems
and without making everybody look at me as a bad Marine." 120 Isham
believed that his communication would thus still be protected under Rule
503. 121 However, the chaplain’s testimony at Isham’s court-martial was a
clear breach of privileged communication. The appellate court stated:
The appellant properly expected that he would be able to
meet with a mental-health professional and that his unit
would bar him from having access to any weapons. He
no doubt anticipated that reassignment or administrative
separation would be forthcoming. However, the chaplain
did not go on to explain that he would have to testify
against the appellant at a court-martial.
Thus, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that
the trial court had erred by allowing the chaplain to testify, and the
conviction and sentence were removed. 122 Importantly, the Isham decision
established a key holding: chaplains may relay information from a penitent
to others for the limited and specific purpose of addressing the penitent’s
Id.

Id.
Id. at 606.
120 48 M.J. 603, 604 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
121 See id. at 606 (“The appellant agreed to this further disclosure for the limited purpose
of getting help and preventing him from carrying out his threats. Therefore, his statements
fell directly within the expansive definition of a “confidential communication” under
Military Rule of Evidence 503(b)(2).”).
122 See id. at 608 (“We hold, therefore, that the provisions of Military Rule of Evidence
503 applied such as to bar the communications the appellant made to the chaplain from
coming into evidence against him.”).
118
119
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immediate situation. In this case, the Isham court believed that the
immediate situation permitted the chaplain to relay enough information to
prevent Isham from harming himself or others, and no more. The Isham
holding thus suggests that the chaplain could and should have had mental
health professionals or command remove his weapon and monitor him, so
long as the reason for doing so was not relayed to others. Doing so
preserves the multiple interests of maintaining confidentiality with
chaplains, and preventing impending violence.
United States v. Shelton123 involved another situation
concerning admission of child abuse. In Shelton, an army soldier
had sexually abused his daughter. The daughter had told her mother
(Shelton’s wife) about the abuse, and the mother then
confronted Shelton but he refused to acknowledge the matter. She
then went to seek help from the civilian chaplain at the church she and
Shelton attended. Shelton and his wife had been receiving marriage
counseling from this chaplain for some time on other issues. She told
the chaplain about the alleged abuse, and he agreed to talk to Shelton
about it.124 Shelton went to the church and met the chaplain and the
chaplain’s assistant, where they prayed together and then talked.
During the discussion, the chaplain said, “Your wife told me something
and I want to know if you did it because it's serious and you can go to
jail for it . . . you claim to be a Christian, Christians don't tell lies,
and so I need to know.”125 Shelton then admitted to sexually abusing
his daughter. The chaplain told him he should bring his wife back to
the church, and he immediately did so. Once she was there, Shelton
told his wife, “I did it. I did it. I'm wrong. I did it.”126 The chaplain then
told both the defendant and his wife that Washington state law
required him to report the abuse. Weeks later, the chaplain advised
the wife that she should report her husband or he would do so. She
went to the military police, who conducted an investigation that led to
Shelton’s admission of abuse. He later told both a social worker and
psychotherapist about the abuse as well. The chaplain’s testimony,
among others, was introduced into trial against Shelton, and he was
subsequently convicted.127
On appeal, Shelton argued that his communications to the chaplain
were privileged, and thus wrongly used against him in the court-martial.
64 M.J. 32 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
See id. at 34-35 (discussing factual circumstances of the case).
125 Id. at 34.
126 Id. at 35.
127
See id. at 34-35 (discussing factual circumstances of the case leading to Shelton’s
eventual confession of abuse to the military investigators).
123
124
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The appellate court first examined whether the three-part test in Moreno
was satisfied. It held that the discussion between Shelton and the chaplain
qualified as a “matter of conscience” because of its heavy religious
overtones. Specifically, they had prayed together prior to their discussion,
and the chaplain had admonished him that, “You claim to be a Christian,
Christians don't tell lies, so I need to know.” 128 Even though the chaplain
had previously counseled Shelton and his wife on secular matters, that did
not preclude the possibility that their subsequent conversation was a
religious one:
These circumstances burdened Appellant's conscience,
and following the advice of his pastor, Rev. Dennis,
Appellant confessed. We note that the past secular
discussion between Appellant and Rev. Dennis related to
financing, budgeting, and family matters. But there is
nothing in the record to establish that these counseling
sessions were as spiritually charged as the counseling
involved in the present case. The mere prior counseling
contact between Rev. Dennis and Appellant on other
matters does not preclude a conclusion that, in the present
instance, Appellant's communication with Rev. Dennis
was a matter of conscience. 129
For these same reasons, the court also concluded that the second
prong of the test was met—the communication was made to a
clergyman in his capacity as a spiritual advisor.130 Finally, there was the
question of whether Shelton intended the communication to be
confidential, which required that the “[c]ourt focuses on Appellant to
make this determination.”131 Even though the defendant’s wife was
present in the second conversation, there was, from Shelton’s
perspective, a “reasonable expectation that the counseling was
indeed confidential.”132 This was because the “wife’s presence was
See 64 M.J. at 38 (citing testimony from the trial court to show that the discussion
between the chaplain and Shelton had clear religious overtones that qualified the
discussion as one of a "matter of conscience").
129 Id.
130
See id. (“Again, we consider the circumstances of Rev. Dennis beginning the
meeting with prayer, the fact that the counseling session occurred at the church, and the
religious atmosphere and spiritual language of the meeting as critical facts establishing
that Appellant's communication with Rev. Dennis was in the clergy's official
capacity.”).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 39.
128
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necessary for his redemption”133 and she thus fell under the meaning of
those whom “disclosure is in furtherance of the purpose of the
communication” under 503(b)(3). In support of this holding, the
appellate court cited the Third Circuit decision of In re Grand Jury
Investigation,134 which held that the presence of a third party in a family
counseling session did not preclude the existence of a clergy-penitent
privilege.135
The appellate court thus concluded that Shelton’s
communication was privileged and should not have been introduced in
court.136
B. Determining who is a qualified chaplain under Rule 503: Kidd,
Coleman, Napolean, and Garries
The military courts have examined cases involving the question of
who qualifies as a chaplain covered by the Rule 503 privilege. This
question is a pertinent one and deserving of judicial review, particularly
with military chaplains potentially serving in multiple roles and settings
while interacting with servicemembers. However, the military cases
which have examined this issue have been based on very narrow factual
bases.
A very early pre-Moreno case was United States vs. Kidd (A.F.B.R.
1955), 137 in which the Air Force Board of Review examined the
circumstances following an airman’s desertion from Andrews Air Force
Base. Defendant Kidd left the base without permission for several months.
Kidd was tried before a Staff Judge Advocate and convicted of desertion.
Prior to sentencing, the Staff Judge Advocate considered the opinion of a
chaplain who was a staff member at the confinement facility that held
Kidd. The chaplain had interviewed Kidd and concluded he was not suited
to be in the Air Force, and should therefore be removed. 138 Kidd argued
that the Staff Judge Advocate should not have heard the chaplain’s opinion
64 M.J. at 39.
918 F.2d 374 (1990).
135 Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374(1990): “[a]s is the case
with the attorney-client privilege, the presence of third parties, [which is] essential to
and in furtherance of the communication, does not vitiate the clergy-communicant
privilege.”).
136 See 64 M.J. at 39 (“Because M.R.E. 503 grants Appellant a right to keep this
privileged conversation confidential, we conclude that the military judge abused his
discretion by ruling that Appellant's statements to his pastor were not privileged and would
be otherwise admissible evidence.").
137 20 CMR 713 (A.F.B.R. 1955).
138 See
id. at 719 (discussing the circumstances in which the chaplain interviewed the
defendant and recommended his severance from service).
133
134
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because it was privileged communication. The court considered the fact
that:
[A]n Air Force Chaplain assigned to a confinement
facility as an additional duty occupies a dual role. On the
one hand he is a staff officer whose function is to aid in
the retraining and rehabilitation of the prisoners and to
advise the commander in matters concerning prisoner
policy . . . On the other hand, he acts as clergyman for
those prisoners who profess his faith or who desire his
spiritual services. Whether a chaplain acts in his secular
or spiritual role may vary from time to time depending
upon the circumstances involved. 139
The Air Force Board of Review held that there was no affirmative
showing that the information gathered by the chaplain was done so in his
official capacity as a clergyman, nor was it clear if the nature of the
chaplain’s conversation with Kidd was about religious or spiritual matters.
Rather, the board simply noted that it was possible that the information
about Kidd was gathered from the chaplain in his non-clergy capacity.
Thus, “absent clear evidence” of that fact, the “presumptions operate in
his [the chaplain’s] favor rather than the reverse” and the board therefore
ruled that there was no privileged communication in this case. 140 Thus,
the Kidd case suggests that for chaplains who have dual roles as clergy and
non-clergy staff, unless there is clear evidence that the chaplain heard
information while acting in his capacity as a clergyman, then it is
presumed that he was acting as non-clergy.
Because of the lack of factual information presented in Kidd, the fact
that it was adjudicated decades before Moreno, and has not yet been
revisited to any significant extent by subsequent courts, it is unclear what
value Kidd has to the question of chaplains having dual roles in
professional settings. Clearly, Kidd does touch on the important issue of
where Rule 503 ends for clergy serving in professional settings in nonchaplain roles, and seemingly demarcates those limits based on whether
the chaplain is serving as a clergyman or a non-clergyman. Subsequent
cases exploring this issue, however, offer little guidance in this area
because of the limited factual scenarios presented.

139
140

Id.
Id.
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In United States v. Coleman (C.M.A. 1988), 141 the Court of Military
Appeals focused on the questions of whether a communication was made
to a clergyman “in the clergyman’s capacity as a spiritual adviser.”142 In
Coleman, the defendant Coleman had sexually abused his daughter. The
daughter had told her mother (Coleman’s wife) about the abuse, and both
the daughter and mother testified against Coleman in a court-martial.
The wife had also informed her father—a church reverend—about the
sexual abuse.143 The reverend had also received a call from Coleman, and
testified in the court-martial to the following:
I received a phone call from Sergeant Coleman, and . . .
he said to me . . . Dad, can you help me, my marriage is
falling apart, and knowing what I had known—my
daughter had come from Michigan . . . and she had told
me about the alleged incident, and . . . I was upset and I'm
sure that . . . [appellant] was upset . . . the whole family
was upset, and I said, “Son, is there any wonder that your
marriage is falling apart? Is it true that you took liberties
with your daughter?” And that, basically was the end of
that conversation, and he said, “to pray for me” and I said,
“I will,” and that's basically what was said. 144
The lower court had admitted the reverend’s testimony over Coleman’s
objection that it be suppressed under Rule 503. The court’s reasoning was
that Rule 503 did not apply. Although they held that the reverend was a
chaplain, the communication itself was not considered a formal act of
religion or a matter of conscience, and it was not communicated to a
chaplain in an official capacity as a spiritual advisor.145 That was
evidenced by the fact that the defendant had referred to the reverend as
“dad” several times. 146 Additionally, Coleman had argued that the
admission of the testimony was information that materially prejudiced the
court against him. However, the appellate court noted that there was
overwhelming evidence from the daughter which indicated his guilt, and

26 M.J. 407 (C.M.A. 1988).
MIL. R. EVID. 503(b).
143 See Coleman, 26 M.J. at 407-408 (discussing the factual background of the case).
144 Id. at 408.
145 See id. at 409 (discussing the trial court’s reasoning).
146 See id. (“I find that the accused did not perceive the communications to have been made
to the clergyman in his capacity as spiritual adviser, as evidenced by his repeated use of
the term “Dad” throughout the conversation.”).
141
142
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the father’s testimony added little or no additional prejudice. 147 The
appellate court also held that the communication was not intended to be
confidential either. 148
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the appellate court, stating
that the communication neither amounted to an act of religion nor
pertained to a matter of conscience. 149 The Military Appeals court was
silent on the other requirements of the rule. The Coleman holding seems
to indicate that the fact the reverend was the defendant’s father in law was
a significant factor excluding the conversation from the privilege. It is
unclear exactly why the conversation itself was not considered a matter of
conscience nor act of religion. That conclusion could have arisen from the
perception that the substance of the conversation did not rise to that level.
Additionally, the fact that the conversation was deemed not intended to be
confidential seems to have arisen from the fact that Coleman’s abuse was
already known to both the reverend and Coleman’s wife. The Coleman
holding in totality seems to suggest that when a clergyman is also a family
member, a discussion with that person cannot be privileged if the facts of
the case suggests that person was communicated to primarily as a family
member.
The issue of defining clergy under Rule 503 when another personal
relationship existed was revisited in United States v. Napolean (C.A.A.F.
1997). 150 In that case, Air Force member Napolean stabbed and killed
another person. She was subsequently confined in a holding facility.
Napolean’s friend Sgt. Walters visited her in jail. Walters testified at the
court-martial that at the jail, Napolean had said that “she wasn’t angry or
147

See id.:
Competent evidence, independent of the communication,
overwhelmingly established appellant's guilt of the offense as charged.
The victim, appellant's daughter, using an anatomically correct doll,
testified clearly, convincingly, and in detail about the indecent acts
committed on her. In addition, appellant's wife testified he admitted
his misconduct to her when she confronted him about the allegation.

Id.
148
149

150

See Coleman, 26 M.J. at 409 (discussing holding of the case).
Id. at 409:
The threshold for claiming the privilege is that “such communication is made
either as a formal act of religion or as a matter of conscience.” Mil.R.Evid.
503(a). As was found by both the military judge and the Court of Military
Review, neither of these two elements is present in the record before us.
46 M.J. 279 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
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enraged or anything when the incident occurred.” 151 Walters also testified
that he visited her “as a friend” 152 but that he prayed with her and was a
lay minister at a base chapel. 153 Napolean was convicted of pre-meditated
murder, and she argued on appeal that her attorney had erred by allowing
Walter’s testimony at trial. She asserted that without his testimony, her
conviction would have been to a lesser charge of murder or
manslaughter. 154 Even though Napolean argued that she believed her
communication to Walters was privileged under Rule 503, 155 the appellate
court held that she could not have “reasonably believed” he was a
clergyman. 156 In the court’s view, a lay minister did not rise to the status
of a clergyman. 157 Additionally, the communication itself fell short of
being an act of religion or matter of conscience. Rather, it was a
communication of emotional support and not “guidance and
forgiveness.” 158 Interestingly, the court in Napolean also added the
distinction that a “communication is not privileged, even if made to a
clergyman, if it is made for emotional support and consolation rather than
as a formal act of religion or as a matter of conscience” 159 and that a
satisfactory definition of the latter would be a communication reflecting
“guidance and forgiveness.” 160 This definition seems to suggest that the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recognizes a clear distinction
between communications made to clergy for purposes of emotional
support, which would not be covered by the rule, and communications
based in spiritual or religious concerns about forgiveness and guidance,
which would be covered language. Napolean is thus relevant in that sense
as it can speak to the dual roles that pastoral chaplains may have in
providing emotional support, or spiritual or religious guidance.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 283.
153 See id. at 284 (quoting testimony from Sergeant Walters about his visits to Napolean).
154 See id. (“Appellant argues that she was prejudiced by TSgt Walters' testimony because
it was the only direct evidence of premeditation and without it, she probably would have
been convicted only of unpremeditated murder or voluntary manslaughter.”).
155 See 46 M.J. at 284 (describing the defendant’s arguments that she believed
her communications with Walters were privileged).
156 Id. at 285.
157 See id. (noting that a lay minister is not a clergyman).
158 See id. (“Finally, we hold that appellant has failed to show that her admissions to
TSgt Walters were a ‘formal act of religion’ or were made ‘as a matter of
conscience.’. . . The circumstances of TSgt Walters' visit, as described in the affidavits,
suggest that appellant was seeking emotional support and consolation, not guidance and
forgiveness.").
159 Id.
160 46 M.J. at 285.
151

152
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A final case in this line worth noting is the earlier decision of United
States v Garries.161 In Garries, the defendant Garries allegedly murdered
his wife in a premeditated fashion. A significant amount of evidence
and witness testimony pointed to Garries’ guilt, and an Air Force trial
court convicted him of murder.162 The issue in the case involved the
testimony of a church deacon and friend of Garries. The deacon was a
fellow Air Force member and Garries’ neighbor. Both of them attended
the same off-base church. Prior to the murder, Garries had come to the
deacon, and asked him where he could find the church pastor. The
deacon said the pastor was out of town. In private, Garries then made
remarks to the deacon that he was upset with his wife and wanted to
“bust her in the face.”163 The deacon testified that at that time, he was
only a deacon and not a pastor certified to do pastoral counseling, and
had only presented himself to the defendant as a friend, and not a
religious figure. On appeal, Garries argued that the witness testimony
from the church deacon was wrongfully introduced into court as it
violated Rule 503. The appellate court ruled against Garries on this
matter. They held that the deacon was not a clergyman, that the
defendant did not at the time believe he was a clergyman, and therefore
the discussion they had was not privileged communication under Rule
503.164 Garries confirmed that the definition of a “clergyman” is a
narrow one, and limited to those who provide spiritual or pastoral
preaching, teaching, and counseling, and not administrative members of
a religious organization such as a church deacon.
C. Clergy communications and criminal investigation warning
requirements: Richards and Benner
Two MRE 503 cases have presented factual scenarios in which
defendants have raised Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 31
arguments. Article 31 prohibits compulsory self-incrimination, and any
violation of such renders subsequent communications inadmissible in
trial. 165 This scenario emerges when a servicemember communicates with
a chaplain about a purported crime, and later raises as a defense the
19 M.J. 845 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985).
See id. at 848-852 (describing background of the case).
163 Id. at 860.
164 See id. at 860 (“First, we hold that Sgt. Hinton was not a person who could act as a
clergyman. Second, we find that the accused did not reasonably believe that Hinton was a
clergyman. Third, we find that the conversation between Hinton and the accused was not
under circumstances amounting to a privileged communication.”).
165 UCMJ art. 31 (2008).
161
162
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argument that the chaplain should have warned the speaker to his Article
231 rights prior to making the communication. An early case was United
States v. Richards (N.M.C.M.R. 1984). 166 In Richards, the defendant was
a Navy clerk who had stolen funds from his ship. Richards met with the
ship chaplain to express his feelings of guilt and to seek advice about next
steps. The chaplain suggested that she meet with a legal officer to consult
about the situation, without disclosing Richards’ identity, and Richards
agreed. At the meeting, the legal officer advised the chaplain that the
defendant should voluntarily admit to the crime. The chaplain
communicated that advice to Richards, and he agreed to have the chaplain
tell command about his crime. He was subsequently convicted and
sentenced by a court-martial. 167
On appeal to the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review, Richards
argued that the chaplain should have read him his Article 31 rights
prohibiting self-incrimination. 168 He argued that because the chaplain had
not read him those rights prior to their initial discussion, all the subsequent
information revealed should have been inadmissible in a court-martial.
The court, however, ruled against Richards, noting that Article 31 rights
are only required when there is a “criminal investigatory purpose.” 169 In
this case, the initial conversation between the chaplain and Richards was
a privileged communication covered under Rule 503 as an “a matter of
conscience,” and not a criminal investigation. Additionally, Richards’
subsequent confession to the crime through the chaplain was considered a
waiver to the privilege under Rule 510 (Waiver of privilege by voluntary
disclosure). 170 His conviction was thus affirmed. Richards thus holds that
17 M.J. 1016 (N.M.C.M.R. 1984).
See id. at 1017-1079 (discussing the factual background to the Richards case).
168 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 831. Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited
(discussed supra on Moreno case).
169 See 17 M.J. 1016, 1019 (1984):
166

167

In our judgment the considerations of concern to Congress in the
enactment of Article 31, UCMJ, are not present in the instant case.
There was no criminal investigatory purpose in the communication
between the chaplain and appellant. The only motivation was
the conduct of a privileged conversation pursuant to MIL.R.EVID.
503. Id.
170

See MIL. R. EVID. 510(a):
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure
of a confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the
person or the person's predecessor while holder of the privilege
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a discussion about issues of conscience with a clergyman resulting in
information about criminal activity is not automatically an “investigation,”
and such discussions do not require the reading of one’s rights against selfincrimination.
United States v. Benner (C.A.A.F. 2002) 171 also implicated Article 31.
In Benner, the defendant’s wife caught Benner sexually abusing their
daughter. The wife and daughter left Benner and urged him to seek help,
but did not report him to authorities. 172 Benner decided to seek counseling
from an Army chaplain, and at their first meeting, he told the chaplain he
had sexually abused his daughter. The chaplain told Benner he would have
to report this information to the military police. The chaplain contacted
the Army Family Advocacy office, where he was (erroneously) informed
that he was required to report the abuse. He then told Benner it would be
best if he turned himself in, and would escort him to the military police.
Benner was hesitant, but went with the chaplain. Once there, he was
notified of his Article 31 rights, and confessed to the police. He was
subsequently convicted of sodomy with a child. 173
On appeal, Benner argued that Rule 503 had been violated when the
chaplain told him he was required to report the abuse. The appellate court
acknowledged that privileged communications with a clergyman are
sealed, and that such communications do not require clergyman to warn
penitents of Article 31 rights against self-incrimination or rights to an
attorney. 174 However, if a military officer happens to be a clergyman, but
“acts on the premise that the penitent's disclosures are not privileged, then
warnings are required.” 175 The court held that because the chaplain had
(erroneously) told Benner he had to report Benner’s actions, and
encouraged him to turn himself in, it effectively tainted his confession.
The appellate court ruled that Benner had come to the chaplain seeking
voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part
of the matter or communication under such circumstances that it would
be inappropriate to allow the claim of privilege. Id.
57 M.J. 210 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
See id. at 211-212 (discussing factual background of Benner and his family).
173 See id. (discussing factual background of Benner’s interaction with the chaplain
and subsequent confession to the military police).
174 See id. at 212 (“When a chaplain questions a penitent in a confidential and clerical
capacity, the results may not be used in a court-martial because they are privileged.
Therefore, the Article 31(b) and Tempia warnings are not required.”).
175 Id.
171

172
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confidential communications, but instead, the chaplain had acted not as a
chaplain giving proper counseling, but as an ordinary officer. Because he
had not properly warned Benner of his rights, his resulting confession was
invalid. 176
D. Synopsis of Rule 503 Cases
The evolved case law on Rule 503 has direct application for chaplains
working in the field, and provides guidance on what to expect in the event
of a legal case. The Moreno case offers an important starting foundation.
The military courts have consistently relied177 on the three-part test
elucidated in Moreno that operationalizes Rule 503.178 Moreno is clear
that if a Service member “confesses” as a matter of conscience or religion
to a chaplain in his or her role as a spiritual advisor, that communication
should be kept confidential and not shared with command. If it is shared,
the communication will be ruled inadmissible under Rule 503. The
Moreno case was reaffirmed in Benner where a military chaplain
erroneously believed he had to report a Service member who had confided
in him that he had abused children. 179 However, both Benner and Moreno
should be compared to the facts and holding in the Beattie case, where a
chaplain advised a Service member who had committed child abuse to
report himself to command, and the Service member voluntarily decided
to do so. 180 The Beattie case illustrates an example of a chaplain acting
within his legal and ethical bounds in a proper fashion, whereas in Benner
and Moreno the chaplains acted improperly. In the very difficult situation
when a chaplain is told information by a Service member in confidence
that suggests he poses an actual, immediate threat to himself or others –
such as suicide or murder – the chaplain should advise the person to seek
help voluntarily. In a dire situation involving immediate harm, Isham
suggests that a chaplain can inform others to take necessary action to
prevent that Service member from committing harmful activity (such as
See 57 M.J. 210, 213-214 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (“Appellant was seeking clerical help.
Instead of providing confidential counseling, the chaplain informed appellant that he was
obliged to report appellant's action and thus, unknown to the chaplain, breach the
“communications to clergy” privilege. At this point, the chaplain was acting outside his
responsibilities as a chaplain, and he was acting solely as an Army officer. As such, he
was required to provide an Article 31 warning before further questioning.”).
177 See supra discussions at notes 114-22 and accompanying text on U.S. v. Isham, 48 M.J.
603 (1998) and notes 123-36 and accompanying text on U.S. v. Shelton, 64 M.J. 32 (2006),
two recent Rule 503 cases which made use of the three-part Moreno test.
178 U.S. v. Moreno, 20 M.J. 623, 626 (1985).
179
57 M.J. 210, 211-212 (2002) (discussing the facts of the case).
180 See 1987 CMR LEXIS 622 at 1-3 (discussing facts in the Beattie case).
176
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removing that person’s weapon or placing him under observation) but not
the reason for doing so in order to preserve confidentiality. 181
The Moreno and Coleman rulings also indicate that the intention of
the penitent has important implications for the applicability of Rule 503.
Courts will examine whether communications are intended to be
confidential from the perspective of the confessor, but as per Coleman will
examine the totality of the factual background to determine whether the
substance of the communication had already been known to others (and
therefore not intended to be confidential), 182 and if the person
communicated to was a clergyman acting within his/her professional
capacity as a spiritual advisor. Coleman holds that if a person is primarily
approached as a family member, Rule 503 does not apply. 183 The Garries
and Napolean cases support Coleman in holding that for a person to be a
clergyman covered by Rule 503, he/she must be a professional clergyman
responsible for religious preaching, teaching, and counseling, and the
confessor must “reasonably believe” the person to be so. 184 Rule 503 only
applies to clergy or their assistants,185 and not to deacons or lesser
administrative positions within a church, 186 or to lay ministers. 187 The Kidd
case is also relevant, as many chaplains may serve in dual roles as a matter
of official assignment. In Kidd, a chaplain assigned to serve on a review
board within a confinement facility was not considered a clergyman for
purposes of Rule 503. 188 Additionally, the Kidd court indicated that in such
a situation, there must be “clear evidence” that the chaplain was serving in
a role as a clergyman as a spiritual advisor in order for coverage to
apply. 189 This case law indicates that courts will permit a strict
interpretation of Rule 503’s requirements for who constitutes a clergyman,
48 M.J. 603, 606 (1998) (holding that in the specific facts of Isham, action could
be taken for the limited purposes of getting help to a service member while preserving
confidentiality).
182 See Coleman, 26 M.J. at 409 (discussing confidentiality in the Coleman case).
183 See id. (discussing facts and holding of the Coleman case).
184 See 19 M.J. 845, 860 (1985) (discussing whether the church deacon was a
clergyman, and deciding that he was not).
185 MIL. R. EVID. 503(B)(1-2).
186 See 19 M.J. 845, 860 (1985) (discussing whether the church deacon was a
clergyman, and deciding that he was not).
187 See 46 M.J. at 116 (holding that a lay minister is not a covered clergyman).
188 See 20 CMR 713, 714-719 (1955) (discussing whether chaplain was acting in
hiscapacity as a clergyman while serving at a confinement facility and holding that he
was not at the time he had received information about a plaintiff).
189 See id. at 719 (discussing the court’s consideration of the chaplain’s dual roles at
the confinement facility in Kidd).
181
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and in what circumstances. Military chaplains should be cognizant of
whether they are working in their professional capacities as spiritual or
religious figures in their interactions with service members, and their
assignments, circumstances, and individual relationships all factor into a
determination of whether they are covered by Rule 503.
IV. Military Rule of Evidence 513: Privileged Communications and
Psychotherapists
The military psychotherapist-patient privilege was created by an
executive order from President Clinton in November of 1999. 190 The
privilege is codified as Rule 513 of the Military Rules of Evidence. It
creates a privilege on the part of a patient to prevent disclosure of
confidential communications with psychotherapists in military courts. 191
As defined by the rule, a “psychotherapist” includes psychiatrists, clinical
psychologists, clinical social workers, or other mental health
professionals, who are licensed to provide such services, and their
assistants, or people reasonably believed by a patient to have those
credentials. 192 “Confidential” communications include those that are not

See 64 FR 55155 (1999) §2 (amending the Manual for Courts-Martial by Executive
Order No. 13140 to include a psychotherapist-patient privilege).
191 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(a):
190

A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing a confidential communication made between
the patient and a psychotherapist or an assistant to the psychotherapist,
in a case arising under the UCMJ, if such communication was made
for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's mental or emotional condition. Id.
192

See MIL. R. EVID. 513(b)(2):
A “psychotherapist” is a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or clinical
social worker who is licensed in any state, territory, possession, the
District of Columbia or Puerto Rico to perform professional services
as such, or who holds credentials to provide such services from any
military health care facility, or is a person reasonably believed by the
patient to have such license or credentials. Id.
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intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those necessary for
transmission of the communication. 193
The establishment of the privilege came after the federal courts
recognized its existence in the 1996 case of Jaffee v. Redmond. 194 In Jaffee,
the Supreme Court identified the social policy rationale for creating the
federal psychotherapist privilege:
Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere
of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to
make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of
the problems for which individuals consult
psychotherapists,
disclosure
of
confidential
communications made during counseling sessions
may cause embarrassment or disgrace . . .
The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest
by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for
individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional
problem. 195
Prior to Jaffee, the military courts had affirmatively rejected the notion
that this privilege existed within the military, largely because the
Military Rules of Evidence expressly barred—and still bars—a
physician/doctor-patient privilege.196 Following the lead of the federal
courts, the military psychotherapist privilege was also created in
recognition of the benefits of
193 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(b)(4): A communication is “confidential” if not intended to
be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of
the rendition of professional services to the patient or those reasonably necessary for
such transmission of the communication. Id.
194 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
195 Id. at 8-9.
196 See MIL. R. EVID. 501(d): “Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules,
information not otherwise privileged does not become privileged on the basis that it was
acquired by a medical officer or civilian physician in a professional capacity.” See also
Stacy E. Flippin, Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 513: A Shield To Protect
Communications of Victims and Witnesses to Psychotherapists, ARMY LAWYER 1,
2-7 (Sept. 2003) (outlining the development of the privilege in federal law and military
cases ruling against it prior to 1999); Barbara J. Zanotti & Rick A. Becker, Marching to
the Beat of a Different Drummer: Is Military Law and Mental Health Out-of-Step after
Jaffee v. Redmond? 41 A.F. L. REV. 1, 1-25 (1997) (discussing the Jaffee ruling by the
Supreme Court and historical treatment of the psychotherapist-privilege in federal law).
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confidential mental health counseling. As recognized in the rule
commentary, the military privilege “is a separate rule based on the social
benefit of confidential counseling recognized by Jaffee, and similar to the
clergy-penitent privilege.” 197
The psychotherapist privilege thus
facilitates a wider policy goal of encouraging servicemembers to seek
help, albeit balanced against the special considerations of the military
context. As also noted in the MRE commentary, these exceptions largely
exist to further operational and mission success:
In deciding to adopt this privilege for courts-martial, the
committee balanced the policy of following federal law
and rules, when practicable and not inconsistent with the
UCMJ or MCM, with the needs of commanders for
knowledge of certain types of information affecting the
military. The exceptions to the rule have been developed
to address the specialized society of the military and
separate concerns that must be met to ensure military
readiness and national security. 198
Thus, unlike the absolute privilege clergy have with Rule 503, there
are seven significant exceptions to Rule 513. No psychotherapist privilege
applies when the patient dies, 199 in communications which are evidence of
child abuse/neglect, or in a proceeding in which a spouse is charged with
a crime against a child or either spouse,200 when federal or state law or
service regulations require reporting of information, 201 when the
psychotherapist believes the patient is a danger to others or himself,202 in
communications involving future commissions of crime, 203 when

See MCM, supra note 24, at analysis at App. 22-51 (“Rule 513 is not a physicianpatient privilege. It is a separate rule based on the social benefit of confidential
counseling recognized by Jaffee, and similar to the clergy-penitent privilege.”).
198 Id.
199 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(1) (stating privilege does not exist “when the patient is
dead”).
200 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(2) (stating privilege does not exist “when the
communication is evidence of child abuse or of neglect, or in a proceeding in which one
spouse is charged with a crime against a child of either spouse” ).
201 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(3) (stating privilege does not exist “when federal law,
state law, or service regulation imposes a duty to report information”).
202 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(4) (stating privilege does not exist “when a
psychotherapist or assistant to a psychotherapist believes that a patient's mental or
emotional condition makes the patient a danger to any person, including the patient”).
203 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(5) (stating privilege does not exist “if the
communication clearly contemplated the future commission of a fraud or crime”).
197
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necessary to ensure safety of military personnel, property, or missions, 204
and when a defendant provides information about his mental conditions
pursuant to a military case not covered under other privileges. 205 The
exceptions generally mirror those found in state law 206 and are thus very
broad.
It is significant to note that the psychotherapist privilege has recently
been amended for policy reasons. Prior to 2015, the privilege contained
an eighth exception for “when admission of disclosure of a communication
is constitutionally required.” 207 This exception was often exploited by
defense counsel to introduce mental health information as evidence for
witness impeachment, 208 and was criticized for being particularly
problematic in cases involving sexual assault. 209 The amendment
removing that exception was directed through the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2015 Subtitle D, Military Justice,
Including Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Prevention and
Response, 210 ostensibly reflecting congressional intent to reform Uniform
Code of Military Justice and MRE provisions dealing with the problem of
sexual assault and violence in the military. 211
Eliminating the
See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(6) (stating privilege does not exist “when necessary to
ensure the safety and security of military personnel, military dependents, military
property, classified information, or the accomplishment of a military mission”).
205 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(7) (stating privilege does not exist “when an accused
offers statements or other evidence concerning his mental condition in defense,
extenuation, or mitigation, under circumstances not covered by R.C.M. 706 or Mil. R.
Evid. 302”).
206 For a discussion of legal requirements implicating confidentiality of psychotherapists,
see Bruce Sales, Mark DeKraai, Susan Hall & Julie Duvall, Child Therapy and the Law,
in THE PRACTICE OF CHILD THERAPY 519-542 (Richard Morris & Thomas
Kratochwill eds., 4th ed., 2007); Mark DeKraai & Bruce Sales, Confidential
communications of psychotherapists, 21 Psychotherapy 293-318 (1984); Mark DeKraai
& Bruce Sales, Privileged communications of psychologists, 13 Professional
Psychology: Research and Practice 382 – 388 (1982).
207 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(8) (2012).
208 See Major Michael Zimmerman, Rudderless: 15 Years and Still Little Direction on
the Boundaries of Military Rule of Evidence 513, 223 MIL. L. REV. 312, 313 (2015)
(discussing the scenario of using the constitutionality exception in defenses to impeach
witnesses based on mental health information).
209 See Major Angel M. Overgaard, Redefining the Narrative: Why Changes to Military
Rule of Evidence 513 Require Courts to Treat the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege as
Nearly Absolute. 224 MIL. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (2016) (discussing the scenario of
defense counsel using the constitutionality exception in sexual assault cases, and
asserting that the “privilege’s misapplication was re-victimization of sexual assault
victims”).
210 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291
[hereinafter NDAA 2015].
211 See Overgaard, supra note 228 at 982-83 (discussing congressional intent and
national interest in preventing sexual assault and providing due protections to victims).
204
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constitutionality exception thus prevented the possibility of a broad search
through a potential victim’s therapy records on the basis of
constitutionality for purposes of impeachment, a concern the MRE
drafting committee had when crafting the exceptions. 212
Similarly, the NDAA of 2015 also clarified the procedural
requirements for MRE 513 hearings. Prior to the changes, if a party sought
to introduce evidence in which there was a dispute as to whether it was
covered by an exception, the rule simply stated that the military judge must
first examine the evidence in camera, though no further guidance was
provided as to when that would be appropriate. 213 Thus, highly sensitive
information could be easily reviewed in closed sessions. As discussed at
length by Major Michael Zimmerman, 214 the 2015 amendments
incorporated elements from the Klemick case, 215 discussed infra, 216
establishing clear thresholds necessary to conduct in camera review of the
mental health information. This includes a finding by the judge by a
preponderance of evidence that the moving party has shown a reasonable
likelihood that the evidence fits under one of the MRE 513 exceptions, 217
is not cumulative of other information, 218 and the moving party made
reasonable efforts to obtain the same information from non-privileged
sources. 219 The NDAA amendments also provided victims the right to
See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 514 (2012), analysis at
App. 22-46 (discussing exceptions to MRE 513 and 514 and noting concern that “this
relatively high standard of release is not intended to invite a fishing expedition for possible
statements made by the victim, nor is it intended to be an exception that effectively
renders the privilege meaningless”). See also Major Cormac M. Smith, Applying the New
Military Rule of Evidence 513: How Adopting Wisconsin’s Interpretation of the
Psychotherapist Privilege Protects Victims and Improves Military Justice, THE ARMY
LAWYER, Nov. 2015, 6, at 6 (describing the scenario where sexual assault victims’
psychotherapy records are produced for in camera review under the constitutionality
exception); Zimmerman, supra note 227 at 329-333 (discussing concern brought about by
the constitutionality exception that would allow searching through very private and
personal mental health records of victims).
213 See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 513(3)(3) (2012)
(stating that review of evidence must be done by a military judge in camera). For an
example of a pre-Klemick case in which in camera review of mental health records with
little additional guidance is presumed, see United States v. Harding, 63 M.J. 65
(C.A.A.F. 2006).
214 See Zimmerman, supra note 227 at 331-336 (discussing post-NDAA 2015
requirements to MRE 513 derived from the Klemick case).
215 65 M.J. 576 (2006).
216 See discussion infra on the 2006 Klemick case at notes 261-270.
217 MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(3)(A-B).
218 Id. at MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(3)(C).
219 Id. at MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(3)(D).
212
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petition for a writ of mandamus to compel compliance to these
requirements if they believed they were being violated. 220
Another noteworthy addition in the 2015 amendments to the rule
included an expansion of the definition of psychotherapists to include
other mental health professionals. 221 Previously, the privilege’s definition
of a psychotherapist was restricted to a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist,
or clinical social worker. 222 Expanding that definition to include other
mental health professionals ostensibly indicates that professionals such as
licensed professional counselors, alcohol and drug abuse counselors, nurse
psychotherapists, and marital and family therapists, may also now be
covered by the privilege. In theory, this broadening of the definition
of psychotherapists should also include pastoral counselors—clergy
members with clinical training to provide counseling or psychotherapy.
Some states do specifically license clinical pastoral therapists, or if not,
pastoral counselors can apply for and practice as other types of mental
health professionals, such as licensed marriage and family therapists.223
Pastoral counselors typically blend clinical psychotherapy and counseling
techniques with their theological and spiritual training to address issues
like addiction and recovery, relationships, and spiritual and moral
injuries. 224 The inclusion of pastoral counselors as psychotherapists
covered by Rule 513 has important implications for clearly identifying
relationships, roles, and ethical boundaries during interactions with
patients and other professionals in a mental health setting.
By both removing the constitutionality exception, and expanding the
coverage of the privilege to include a greater scope of mental health
professionals, Congress effectively strengthened the psychotherapy
privilege, a trend which ostensibly facilitates the goal of encouraging
servicemembers to seek confidential mental health counseling from
qualified professionals.

See NDAA 2015, supra note 229, at §537(1) (providing for victims to petition for a
writ of mandamus to enforce compliance with the MRE 412 and 513).
221 See id. §537(1) (stating that Rule 513 be expanded to cover “other licensed mental
health professionals”).
222 See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, MIL. R. EVID. 514 (2012),
223 See American Association of Pastoral Counselors, Licensing,
http://www.aapc.org/Default.aspx?ssid= 74&NavPTypeId= 1189 (last visited April 6,
2017) (outlining state licensing status for pastoral counselors).
224
See generally, ROBERT J. WICKS, RICHARD D. PARSONS, & DONALD CAPPS, CLINICAL
HANDBOOK OF PASTORAL COUNSELING, VOL. 1 (1993).
220
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A. Setting the foundations in Jenkins and Klemick
Two early cases in which a military court examined the new privilege
of Rule 513 were United States v. Rodriguez (C.A.A.F. 2000) 225 and
United States v. Paaluhi (C.A.A.F. 2000). 226 Rodriguez involved a
defendant stationed in Bosnia who rigged a weapon to shoot himself in
order to avoid duty. During counseling treatment with a psychiatrist,
Rodriguez admitted he intentionally shot himself to get out of duty and
was not suicidal. That testimony was later introduced in his court-martial,
and he was subsequently found guilty of wounding himself to avoid
hazardous duty. 227 The shooting, communication with the psychiatrist,
and original court-martial all took place prior to when Rule 513 was
established. Rodriguez argued to the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces that the psychotherapist privilege prevented the testimony from
being introduced, but the court instead ruled that because the military
psychotherapist privilege was not yet in force at the time of the activity in
question, it did not shield the communications. 228 Similarly, Paaluhi
involved a defendant’s confession to a Navy psychologist that he had been
having sexual relations with his stepdaughter, though those
communications also occurred before the military psychotherapist
privilege had been recognized. 229 As in Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces also ruled that the privilege did not apply because
the incriminating statements were made in 1996, prior to the creation of
the privilege. 230
It was not until 2006 that the courts examined two cases with
significant substantive repercussions. One was United States v. Jenkins
(C.A.A.F. 2006), 231 in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
scrutinized the breadth of the exceptions under Rule 513. The other major
case was United States v. Klemick (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006). 232
Klemick established parameters for Rule 513 hearings that would later be
54 M.J. 156 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
54 M.J. 181 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
227 See Rodriguez, 54 M.J. 156, 156-158 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating background facts to the
case).
228 See 54 M.J. at 160-61 (finding that presidential intent towards the psychotherapist
privilege controlled the outcomes of the case).
229 See id. at 182-84 (discussing the timing and background of Paaluhi’s communications
to the Navy clinical psychologist).
230 See id. at 183 (holding no military psychotherapist privilege existed at the time of the
activity in question).
231
63 M.J. 426 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
232 65 M.J. 576 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).
225
226
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incorporated into the 2015 NDAA amendments, and is thus significant for
strengthening the psychotherapist privilege in light of its many exceptions.
In Jenkins, the defendant was drunk and accosted a black airman with
racial taunts. During the confrontation, Jenkins drew a knife and chased
the airman while yelling “I’m going to kill y’all n****** tonight.” He
was apprehended by military police and released the next day, and ordered
to walk home by the officer in charge. He then told friends about the
officer in command: “That f****** bitch made me mad . . . I would have
cut her f****** throat.” His behavior was reported to command, and he
was directed to a mental health evaluation by the command clinical
psychologist. 233 At his court-martial, the psychologist testified that Jenkins
had abnormally high anger, low self-control, should be confined due to his
danger to others, and should ultimately receive treatment outside of the
military. 234 He was subsequently found guilty on several charges of
disorderly conduct, threats, and substance abuse, and ordered to jail time
and then dishonorable discharge. 235
Before the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Jenkins argued that
the court-martial judge had erred by allowing the psychologist to testify
via the “dangerousness” exceptions to the psychotherapist
privilege: 513(d)(4)—when a psychotherapist believes the patient is a
“danger to any person, including the patient”;236 and 513(d)(6)—–
“when necessary to ensure the safety and security of military
personnel.”237 He asserted that the exceptions were so broad and vague,
that a reasonable Service member could not know what would or
would not qualify under these dangerousness exceptions, and that
their ambiguity was thus unfair to prospective mental health
patients.238 The court recognized that the exceptions were broad,
and their applicability necessitated a fact-specific inquiry by judges.239
See id. at 427 (describing the defendant’s behavior).
See id. at 428 (describing the findings and testimony of the clinical psychologist to
Jenkins’ mental state of mind).
235 See id. at 426 (describing charges and sentencing for defendant).
236 MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(4).
237 MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(6).
238 See 63 M.J. at 429-430 (describing defendant’s arguments that the exceptions to
Rule 513 were unfairly broad and demanded more specific definitions).
239 See id. at 430 (noting that “Whether the exceptions apply is necessarily a fact-specific
determination for a military judge to consider with an accurate awareness of the facts
underlying the dispute, just as hearsay determinations necessarily involve context. It is for
this reason that the M.R.E. forego detailed analyses of their application in different factual
scenarios”).
233
234
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In its ruling, the court declined to establish new tests, and held that the
factual evidence was sufficient to indicate that the dangerousness
exceptions applied. Jenkins had chased another airman with a knife,
threatened to kill the commanding officer, and the psychologist had tested
and confirmed Jenkins’ anger and control issues. The court concluded
that, “[a]lthough we may not at this point be able to determine every
context in which M.R.E. 513(d)(4) and (6) might apply, we conclude with
confidence that the two exceptions were implicated when Appellant made
threats to kill persons while brandishing a fourteen-inch knife.” 240 Jenkins
serves as a clear example of the rationale for these dangerousness
exceptions to psychotherapy communications. The court found no need
to further narrow the exception language beyond the text of the rule. The
presence of actual death threats, as well as the findings of the clinical
psychologist establishing the defendant’s dangerousness, were sufficient
to trigger those exceptions to the psychotherapist privilege.
United States v. Klemick 241 involved a determination of whether a
factual basis was necessary to review evidence in camera (in private) for
admissibility under the Rule 513(d)(2) exception for communications that
are evidence of child abuse. Klemick had been charged with assault and
manslaughter following the shaking death of his baby child. During his
court-martial, the government had sought admission of treatment
information from discussions between Klemick’s wife and her
psychotherapist following the child’s death. The military prosecutor
argued that the information could be introduced as an exception to the
psychotherapist privilege because it was relevant to the case, over the
protests of both Klemick and his wife, who was unavailable to testify due
to a high-risk medical situation. 242 The trial judge reviewed the
psychotherapist records in camera, and then released portions of it to both
the defense and prosecution to be potentially used in cross-examination as
part of Rule 513(e) procedures for evidentiary review. 243 Klemick was
subsequently convicted of manslaughter, and argued on appeal that prior

Id. at 431.
65 M.J. 576 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).
242
See id. at 578 (noting the argument that the psychotherapist records which
show information about “substantive events in the instant case”).
243 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(2-3) (stating that “[b]efore ordering the production or
admission of evidence of a patient's records or communication, the military judge shall
conduct a hearing . . . The military judge shall examine the evidence or a proffer thereof
in camera, if such examination is necessary to rule on the motion”).
240

241
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to in camera review of evidence, some threshold indication of evidentiary
relevance must be established to use the exception. 244
The Navy-Marine Court of Criminal Appeals noted that there was no
prior precedent within military or federal law to the immediate question,
and then looked to state law for relevant cases. 245 Citing the Wisconsin
Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v Green, 246 the military court quoted
Wisconsin’s ruling requiring in such circumstances “a specific factual
basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the records contain
relevant information necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence
and is not merely cumulative to other evidence.” 247 Adapting this
threshold, the Navy-Marine Court identified a three-part test for Rule 513
requiring a determination of whether (1) a specific factual basis showed a
“reasonable likelihood” that privileged records were admissible under the
child abuse exception, (2) the information had independently probative
value and was not just cumulative to other information already available,
and (3) a requirement that reasonable efforts were made to obtain the
“same or substantially similar information through non-privileged
sources.” 248 In Klemick, the government had satisfied each of these
requirements. The known facts of the case were enough to demonstrate
the likelihood that the psychotherapist records of Klemick’s wife were
reasonably likely to contain information related to child abuse, that
information had independent probative value, and attempts had been made
to interview the wife but were unsuccessful as she was experiencing
medical issues. 249 The Klemick ruling thus established the threshold to
determine requirements for review of privileged communications, with the
relevant standard being “reasonable likelihood” that it was admissible. As
noted supra, 250 the Klemick analysis was incorporated into the NDAA
2015 amendments as part of an effort to strengthen the privilege.

See 65 M.J. at 579 (outlining the defendant’s arguments about that the
“[g]overnment showing in this case was not sufficient to pierce the veil of privilege”).
245 See id. (“We have found no applicable military or Federal case law. For their persuasive
authority only, we will consider State appellate court decisions addressing the issue of
prerequisites for in camera review under State psychotherapist-patient privilege rules
similar to MIL. R. EVID. 513.”).
246 253 Wis. 2d 356 (2002).
247 See 65 M.J. at 579 (citing Wisconsin v. Greene, 253 Wis. 2d 356 (2002)).
248 Id. at 580.
249 See id. (outlining reasons why “the Government satisfied this three-part standard”).
250 See footnotes 226-243 et seq and accompanying text discussing the NDAA 2015
changes.
244
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B. Introducing sexual behavior evidence via the constitutionality
exception to Rule 513: Nixon, Hohenstein, Palmer, and Hudgins
United States v. Nixon (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012), 251 United
States v. Hohenstein (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013), 252 United States
v. Palmer (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), 253 and United States v.
Hudgins (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013), 254 are pre-NDAA 2015
cases that illustrated how the constitutionality exception of MRE 513 was
litigated as a defense tactic. Under this exception, a move to admit mental
health records under an argument that it furthered constitutional rights to
a fair trial (e.g. via the sixth amendment) was possible. Defense would
also seek to introduce evidence about sexual behavior that would bypass
MRE 412, 255 the military rape shield provision (which was also
strengthened under NDAA 2015 amendments to protect victims of sexual
assault). 256
United States v. Nixon 257 was an appeal based on an asserted error in
the introduction of potential impeachment or exculpatory evidence.
Defendant Nixon allegedly sexually assaulted three of his daughters,
which he had admitted to his wife. 258 Nixon was subsequently convicted
of rape and sentenced to 18 years confinement. 259 Prior to his courtmartial, the military judge had reviewed in camera the mental health
records of his wife and three daughters, and subsequently released a
summarized portion of the records – but not all of them – to the defense
and prosecution. On appeal to the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals,
Nixon argued that the judge erred by not releasing all of those records, as
they arguably would have showed that A) one of his daughters had been
untruthful about her sexual activity, and B) another daughter may have
been sexually abused by her brother, not Nixon, and that her recollection
about who assaulted her may thus not have been correct. 260 To support his
assertion, Nixon relied on the Military Rules of Court Martial
2012 WL 5991775 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012).
2013 WL 3971576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013)
253 2013 WL 6579713 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 25, 2013).
254 2014 WL 2038866 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2014).
255 MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 412.
256 See NDAA 2015, supra note 229, at §537(1) (providing for victims to petition for a
writ of mandamus to enforce compliance with the MRE 412 and 513).
257 2012 WL 5991775 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2012).
258 See id. at 1 (discussing facts involving Nixon’s sexual assaults on his daughters).
259 See id. (discussing court-martial and sentencing of defendant).
260
See id. at 16 (outlining Nixon’s arguments that information not released may have
altered or mitigated the case against him).
251
252
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701(a)(2)(B), which allow the defense in discovery to obtain “results or
reports of physical or mental examinations . . . which are within the
possession, custody, or control of military authorities . . . and which are
material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the
trial counsel as evidence in the prosecution case-in-chief at trial.” 261
The court disagreed with Nixon. It noted that Rule of Evidence 412 262
prevents the admission of evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior unless it
is offered to prove someone other than the accused was the source of
semen, injury or other evidence, proves consent, or violates the
constitutional rights of the accused. 263 It also noted that despite the CourtsMartial Rule 701(a)(2)(B), Rule 513 protects psychotherapist records. 264
In this case, the court held that the information from the records was
appropriately withheld by the trial judge because its alleged contents
261
262

Rules for Court Martial 701(a)(2)(B).
See MIL. R. EVID. 412(a)(1-2):
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not
admissible in any proceeding involving an alleged sexual offense
except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual
predisposition.

Id. It is noted in the official commentary to the Military Rules of Evidence that the purpose
of Rule 412 is “intended to shield victims of sexual assaults from the often embarrassing
and degrading cross-examination and evidence presentations common to prosecutions of
such offenses.” See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL UNITED STATES A22-36 (2012).
263 See MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A-C):
(1) In a proceeding, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the
sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent
or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Id.
264 See 2012 WL 5991775 at 17 (stating that “Mil. R. Evid. 513(a) protects the records
covered under R.C.M. 701(f), and none of the exceptions under Mil. R. Evid. 513(d)(1)(8) justify disclosure in the case sub judice”).
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amounted to an “alleged act of a third party, and not the accused.” 265 The
alleged content would not have resulted in a reasonable probability that its
disclosure would have changed the result of the case in light of the totality
of the evidence, as enough evidence existed pointing to Nixon’s guilt, and
it would outweigh any probative value of speculation that the records may
have helped Nixon’s position. 266 Finally, the contents of the records were
not admissible under any of the exceptions of Rule 412. 267
United States v. Hohenstein 268 featured a similar discovery-based
argument as that in Nixon. Defendant Hohenstein had allegedly sexually
assaulted a friend of his daughter’s during a sleepover. Hohenstein denied
the assault had occurred. 269 The trial record showed that in addition to the
assault, there was a dispute about whether the victim had been truthful
about another sexual assault that had allegedly occurred a year earlier by
a different perpetrator. 270 The military judge, however, had not introduced
evidence of that prior alleged assault as it was prevented by Rule of
Evidence 412, which bars admissibility of evidence of prior sexual
behavior unrelated to the immediate case. 271 Hohenstein argued that
evidence of her untruthfulness regarding the prior assault should be used
to question her credibility. 272 Following his conviction, the Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the trial judge had correctly excluded
evidence regarding the alleged prior assault because it was not relevant to
Hohenstein’s case and risked prejudice towards the victim. 273 Hohenstein
also argued that the judge erred by not admitting evidence from the
victim’s discussions with a psychotherapist, which he argued was
admissible under Rule 513(d)(8) (no psychotherapy privilege “when
admission or disclosure of a communication is constitutionally required”),
because he could use that information to impeach the victim. 274 The court
Id. at 17.
See id. at 18 (noting that the alleged information not disclosed, in order to be material
to Nixon’s case, had to have been information that would have created a reasonable
probability that its disclosure would have resulted in a different conclusion).
267 See id. (noting that “[f]inally, even if the appellant was entitled to discover this
information, Mil. R. Evid. 412 barred its admission, and none of the exceptions under Mil.
R. Evid. 412(b) apply”).
268 2013 WL 3971576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013).
269 See id. at 1-2 (discussing the facts of the case).
270 See id. at 1-2 (discussing the alleged sexual assault a year earlier).
271 See MIL. R. EVID. 412(a)(1-2) (barring evidence about a victim’s prior sexual behavior).
272 See 2013 WL 3971576 at 2 (outlining the appellant’s argument about judicial error).
273 See id. at 4 (agreeing with the trial judge that the evidence of the prior alleged sexual
assault was correctly excluded under Rule 412).
274 See id. at 5 (discussing the alleged error under Rule 513).
265
266
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also ruled against Hohenstein on this point, noting that the trial judge had
correctly reviewed the psychotherapist records in camera, found that there
was no or little information relevant to the defense within the privileged
information, and thus properly excluded it. 275 The Hohenstein ruling,
along with Nixon, confirmed that the courts are reluctant to admit evidence
from psychotherapy records via the 513 child abuse ((d)(2)) or
constitutionality ((d)(8)) exceptions, though they also reflect how the
constitutionality exception served as an opportunity for defense counsel to
exploit.
Palmer involved an assignment for error regarding a trial judge’s
discretion in the limited release of psychotherapist records. Palmer was
the next door neighbor of the alleged victim. During a night of drinking
at his house, Palmer slipped some GHB “date rape” drug into the victim’s
drink, and sexually assaulted and raped her while she was unconscious.
Upon waking up, she was taken to the hospital for examination, where
doctors found both traces of GHB in her urine, and physical evidence of
the sexual assault.276 The victim also testified to having nightmares and
being emotionally upset after the experience. 277 Palmer was subsequently
convicted by the trial judge of rape, and sentenced to four years in prison.
Before the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, Palmer argued that
the trial judge had erred by not allowing further evidence from the victim’s
psychotherapist records be used in cross-examination. 278 Prior to the rape,
the victim had been seeing a psychotherapist and had taken a mental health
questionnaire with forty-five questions on it. Several weeks after the rape,
she re-took the same questionnaire. The military judge had released all
records to both parties prior to trial, but only allowed the defense to crossexamine the victim on 5 of the 45 questions. Palmer’s argument was that
being allowed to cross-examine her on all the questions would have shown
that her test results had not changed following the incident, indicating that
the rape did not badly affect her. 279
See id. (stating “[w]e agree with the military judge. As he pointed out, the evidence
in the mental health records was ‘scant.’”)
276 See Palmer, supra note 273 at 1-3 (describing the facts of the case).
277 See id. at 4 (noting that the victim had testified about having nightmares and
becoming upset whenever she encountered the perpetrator after the attack).
278 See id. (outlining Palmer’s assertions on appeal regarding the victim’s mental health
records).
275

See id. (“The trial defense counsel's argument was that her overall interpersonal
relations score remained essentially the same, which showed she was not affected by the
rape.”).
279
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In its review of the trial judge’s discretion, the court noted that judges
“have broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on crossexamination” 280 as per Rule 513(e)(4) procedures in the judge’s
determination of admissibility of patient records. 281 However, the Rule
513(8) exception allowing disclosure of communication when
constitutionally required still requires admission of evidence if it is
necessary for one’s constitutional right to confront witnesses under the
sixth amendment. 282 In the immediate case, the victim had testified about
having nightmares after the incident, and the trial judge had restricted
cross-examination using the questionnaire only to those items relevant to
that specific testimony, and not all the mental health records. The court
thus concluded that this narrowing by the trial judge had “struck an
appropriate balance between the appellant's constitutional rights and the
alleged victim's privileged communications to her mental health
provider.” 283 The conviction of Palmer was therefore upheld.
Hudgins 284 involved a similar situation to that of Palmer. In Hudgins,
the defendant allegedly raped two airwomen in two different and separate
times. Physical medical examination had confirmed at least one of the
sexual assaults. One victim had reported the alleged rape weeks after it
had occurred, only after experiencing nightmares and her boyfriend
encouraged her to report it to her command. Hudgins had denied the
charges and testified that the sex was consensual. The trial judge
reviewed records from a psychotherapist the victim had been seeing, and
released selected amounts to the defense.285 Hudgins was ultimately
convicted of the charges, but on appeal he argued the trial judge had
erred by not providing more of the victim’s psychotherapist records
under the constitutionality exception of Rule 513(d)(8).286 He argued the
theory that the
See 2013 WL 6579713 at 4 (citing U.S. v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120,
129 (C.A.A.F.2000)).
281 See MIL. R. EVID. 513(e)(4) (“To prevent unnecessary disclosure of evidence of
patient's records or communications, the military judge may issue protective orders
or may a admit only portions of the evidence.”).
282 See id. at 4-5 (discussing the constitutionality requirements regarding cross
examination and exceptions to privileged psychotherapist records).
283 Id. at 5.
284 2014 WL 2038866 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2014).
285 See id. at 1-4 (discussing the factual background to the case and the situation
involving airman A1C PS).
286 See id. at 5 (outlining the defendant’s arguments that more of the victim’s mental
records should have been release because they were constitutionally required for at least
two reasons).
280
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psychotherapist records would have shown the victim’s relationship with
her boyfriend was not strong, and that she made up the allegation of assault
so her boyfriend would not know the sex was consensual. 287
In reviewing Hudgins’ argument, the appellate court recognized that
Rule 513(d)(8) required disclosure of psychotherapist records when
constitutionally required. 288 It applied an analysis to determine if any error
in not releasing further records was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 289 Noting that the records in question did not have any compelling
evidence to show a poor relationship between the victim and her
boyfriend, and the fact that defense counsel had an opportunity to cross
examine the victim on the alleged issue but did not, the appellate court
decided that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus
had no or little impact on the court-martial to find that the information was
constitutionally required. 290
D. Synopsis of Rule 513 Cases
Significant case law surrounding Military Rule of Evidence 513 case
law has largely focused on evidence admissibility issues for information
covered under one of the rule’s broad exceptions. The Klemick case, and
the incorporation of the court’s holding into the post-NDAA 2015 Rule
513, have provided additional protections for mental health records by
closing the constitutionality exception and clarifying the evidentiary
287

See id.:
“He argues such records were constitutionally required for two
reasons: (1) The defense could have used the records to counter A1C
PS's testimony in the Mil. R. Evid. 412 hearing that her relationship
with her boyfriend was very strong; and (2) The statements in the
mental health records could have supported the defense's theory that
A1C PS fabricated the sexual assault allegation to cover up a
consensual sexual encounter with the appellant out of fear that her
boyfriend would be upset with her.”

Id.
See id. (citing Rule 513(d)(8) regarding the constitutional exception to
the psychotherapist privilege record).
289 See 2014 WL 2038866 at 5-6 (examining the trial judge’s admittance of evidence
to determine if an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
290 See id. at 5 (“Trial defense counsel's own actions therefore demonstrate that
the additional evidence contained in A1C PS's mental health records was not so
probative as to be constitutionally required, or if it was required to be disclosed, its
absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
288
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threshold for in camera review of evidence for introduction. These
changes presumably support the wider policy objectives of protecting
victim’s rights, as well as encouraging individuals to seek help from
psychotherapists without fear that highly personal information would be
used in cross-examination.
Outside of these cases, there is a dearth in case law examining the
other parameters of the Rule 513 exceptions. Jenkins remains a vitally
important holding. The narrow ruling indicates that testimony of a
psychotherapist will be allowed under the dangerousness exception if the
behavior of the person at issue rises to level of assault and death threats.
This suggests that courts will examine the total circumstances of a case to
determine if a psychotherapist’s assessment of an individual as dangerous
is warranted. The broader relevance of Jenkins is that it reflects judicial
deference to psychotherapists’ determinations of dangerousness, and the
extent to which the psychotherapist privilege is limited by the exception.
This clearly reflects the valid military concerns of ensuring the safety and
security of other personnel, and the success of military operations and
missions.
V. Conclusion: Towards Guidance for Chaplains and Mental Health
Practitioners in the Military
We found no cases directly involving chaplains and mental health
providers working together in a military context, either by design or
happenstance. Additionally, we found no instances of official regulation
for the joint handling of confidential, sensitive information by chaplains
and mental health providers working together. This seems to suggest that
this is an area in need of policy guidance, particularly given the fact that
the handling of sensitive mental health-related information is a significant
concern for many servicemembers, and that efforts to integrate chaplains
and mental health providers together have become more pronounced with
the Integrated Mental Health Strategy. Recent surveys conducted by the
DoD to explore implementation strategies of the Integrated Mental Health
Strategy indicate that military chaplains welcome collaboration with
mental health professionals. 291 The desire by both professionals in the
field and leadership to improve collaboration also justifies a
291 See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and mental health in the Department of
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY 3, 13 (2013)
(discussing results of DVA / DoD chaplain survey which indicated 95% support for closer
collaboration between chaplains and mental health professionals).
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reconsideration of how the military rules of evidence would facilitate such
collaboration, and whether any changes to the rules, or to practices, are
necessary.
This review of the MRE 503 and 513 case law is helpful in
conceptualizing how each rule facilitates the wider policy rationales of
each privilege, and its applicability to the current needs of the military.
Developments in Rule 513 demonstrate an adherence to wider policy
goals. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Jaffee and the MCM
commentary, the policy rationale behind the psychotherapist privilege
codified in MRE 513 is to encourage servicemembers to seek help and
counseling from mental health professionals. 292 This rationale is,
however, balanced against the military interests of preventing dangers to
oneself or others, criminal activities, or other issues that jeopardize safety,
security, and the success of military missions. 293 This includes exceptions
for other compelling societal and military interests, such as preventing
child abuse. 294 Appellate case law surrounding MRE 513 reflected how
the constitutionality exception of the rule allowed for mental health
records to be scrutinized in courts. The NDAA 2015 amendments
eliminating that exception thus reflect a clear intent to strengthen the
psychotherapist privilege, furthering the policy of encouraging
servicemembers to seek help from psychotherapists without a concern that
such very personal information might be reviewable in evidentiary
hearings. This development should thus be welcome by patientservicemembers, plaintiff-victims, mental health professionals, and the
military in general.
Whereas the policy rationale of the psychotherapist privilege is to
encourage help-seeking behavior among servicemembers, the historical
and still main policy reason behind MRE 503 is to facilitate free
expression of religion within the services. 295 Courts like Moreno have
recognized that this includes safeguarding communications between
individuals and clergyman about deeply personal, troubling matters. 296

See supra footnotes 208-216 and accompanying discussion about the policy
rationale behind Rule 513.
293 See MCM, supra note 24, MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(1-7) (listing exceptions to
the psychotherapist privilege).
294 See id. at (d)(2) (stating no privilege for evidence of child abuse or neglect).
295 See supra footnotes 77-84 and accompanying discussion about the policy rationale
behind Rule 503.
296 See United States v. Moreno, 20 M.J. 623 (A.C.M.R. 1985):
292
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Cases under MRE 503 such as Beattie, Isham, and others, do indeed
indicate that, at times, military chaplains are confronted with situations
that present clear and sometimes immediate dangers.297 Although it is
unclear how often this occurs, it does raise legitimate questions about
the clergy privilege. Commenters have debated why, for example,
the compelling state interest in protecting children from abuse does not
apply to military chaplains vis-a-vis an exception to privileged
communications, when it does for military psychotherapists and
their civilian clergy counterparts through state law.298 No official
rationale has been offered by military or courts to precisely explain the
uniquely absolute privilege military clergy maintain, but it is likely
a combination of historical deference to the profession, an
unwillingness by the military to intrude on religious expression
the
generally, and most importantly, a recognition that weakening
privilege
would
dis-incentivize confidential communications and
counseling with chaplains. The absolute nature of the privilege thus
seems to affirm an unspoken position by the military placing great
value
on
the
importance
of
completely confidential
communications with chaplains and its role in troop morale and
military life. This policy position is affirmed in rulings like Beattie
and Isham, which recognize an important role for chaplains in
referring troubled servicemembers to others in cases of immediate
danger, while maintaining the confidentiality of communications.299
The desire of the military to integrate chaplains more prominently in
mental health presents at least two different policy approaches.
Professional military chaplains, such as certified pastoral counselors, have
shown both greater aptitude and willingness to address servicemembers’
mental health issues. This signifies an opportunity to potentially expand
the role of military chaplaincy from its historical role of facilitating
freedom of religious expression to a more pronounced and specific role in
The privilege regarding communications with a clergyman
reflects an accommodation between the public's right to
evidence and the individual's need to be able to speak with a
spiritual counselor, in absolute confidence, and disclose the
wrongs done or evils thought and receive spiritual absolution,
consolation, or guidance in return.
Id. at 626.

See supra footnotes 111-122 and accompanying discussion on MRE 503 cases.
For a comprehensive discussion of this debate, see Shane Cooper, Chaplains Caught in
the Middle: The Military’s ‘Absolute’ Penitent-Clergy Privilege Meets State “Mandatory’
Child Abuse Reporting Laws, 49 NAVAL L. R. 128 (2002).
299 See supra footnotes 111-122 and accompanying discussion on MRE 503 cases.
297
298
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facilitating spiritual care within the larger military health system. The
argument for doing so would be grounded in two general assertions. First
would be that spiritual well-being plays an important role in overall wellbeing and health, and that chaplains are uniquely fit to address this role. 300
The second assertion would be that chaplains already play a defacto role
as informal (and sometimes formal) mental health professionals, in
addition to their traditional role of facilitating religious expression. A
formal recognition of a shift in the overall responsibilities of military
chaplains would be a major sea change in policy, however. Arguably, such
a shift might involve a corresponding change in the MRE 503 as well, but
such a debate would involve multiple considerations. We would anticipate
that major questions would revolve around the extent to which the absolute
privilege for clergy would be suitable in situations where chaplains assume
a role that falls outside of religious communications, and into the realm of
psychotherapy. The related major question would therefore be whether
“spiritual care” is a part of religious communications (covered under MRE
503), or psychotherapy (covered under MRE 513), and identifying where
the line between the two exists.
A second approach, and likely the approach that will be maintained for the
foreseeable future, is maintenance of the status quo in terms of the official
roles of chaplains and psychotherapists in the military, and their respective
privileges of communication. However, this does not diminish the need
to address the need to better facilitate integration and collaboration
between the two professions in terms of improving practices. For
example, the presence of chaplains in treatment settings is not new, but
their role as an active treatment team member may not be fully
understood by servicemembers who have expectations of complete
confidentiality in
Numerous studies have linked spiritual health, religiosity, and well-being with the
presence or absence of depression or other mental health issues, substance abuse issues,
and health resiliency in general. This can be particularly prominent among military
veterans and/or PTSD survivors. See for example, Kenneth Pargament & Patrick J.
Sweeney, Building Spiritual Fitness in the Army: An Innovative Approach to a Vital
Aspect of Human Development, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 58 (2011) (presenting the
conceptual model for spiritual fitness within the U.S. Army). Numerous studies or
models have linked spiritual health, religiosity, and well-being with the presence or
absence of depression or other mental health issues, substance abuse issues, and health
resiliency in general. See Jill Bormann et al., Spiritual Wellbeing Mediates PTSD
Change in Veterans with Military-Related PTSD, 19 INTL. J. BEHAVIORAL MED.
496 (2012); Joseph m. Currier et al., Spiritual Functioning among Veterans Seeking
Residential Treatment for PTSD: A Matched Control Group Study, 1 SPIRITUALITY
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 3 (2014); Brett Litz et al., Moral Injury and Moral Repair in
War Veterans: A preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy, 29 CLINICAL PSYCH.
R. 695 92009).
300
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their interactions with them. Commenters have offered suggestions for
how practices can be improved to clarify role boundaries and expectations,
and develop or augment systems of support to further collaboration,
effective communication, and positive outcomes for servicemembers. For
example, credentialing of chaplains to work in mental health environments
within military settings should include guidance to assist chaplains as they
navigate the roles they occupy as spiritual advisors in conjunction with
that of mental health treatment team member. 301 Standard language should
be developed for chaplain use to explain the limits of privilege and the
type of information they will share with other team members.
Additionally, clear guidance must be made available to mental health
professionals about what to expect from chaplains participating on
treatment teams and the role of chaplains in general. 302 In cases where
referrals to or from mental health professionals or chaplains to the other is
an appropriate option, clear protocols should be developed for
communications of necessary information while adhering to
confidentiality. 303 The ultimate goal of such recommendations is to
enhance access to safe, coordinated, quality mental health care for
servicemembers that recognizes spiritual care as a treatment component.

301 See Denise Bulling et al., Confidentiality and Mental Health/Chaplaincy
Collaboration, 25 MIL. PSYCH. 557, 565 (2014) (discussing recommendations for
training chaplains to collaborate with mental health professionals).
302 See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Chaplaincy and mental health in the Department of
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, 19 J. HEALTH CARE CHAPLAINCY 3,
9-10 (2013) (discussing the need to improve understanding and trust between mental
health professionals and chaplains in order to promote collaboration).
303 See Jason A. Nieuwsma et al., Improving Patient-Centered Care via Integration of
Chaplains with Mental Health Care, DVA/DoD Joint Incentive Fund project final report
26 (2015) (outlining progress towards streamlining and adjusting referral practices
between mental health and chaplaincy within DVA and DoD settings).

